THE LEBANON FACTOR

Within the historical context of the region, Lebanon had maintained a precarious balance between membership in the Arab league with a pro-Soviet policy and a pro-Western leaning which contradicted the Arab Leagues policy. The balancing act collapsed in the early 1970's when Syria gaining enough strength and capitalizing on a strong Palestinian presence in Lebanon, moved to eliminate the potential strengthening of Western influence in the region through Lebanon.

The world did not seem too concerned with such a move. The Arab League at that time supported such a move, using the Lebanese anti-Western minority as cover for its policy. Israel, America's regional ally, which had initiated its efforts to integrate into the Middle Eastern mainstream through its peace with Egypt saw a benefit in Lebanon's destruction, since it eliminated a potential strong competitor to its economic prowess. 

As such, Lebanon received enough support in its struggle to prevent a Syrian take over, which would have strengthened the Soviet camp in the region, but not enough support to actually regain independence. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the preparations for the peace process in the early 1990's eliminated the need to prevent a Syrian take over of Lebanon. Lebanon was considered irrelevant to the success of the process and Syria, no longer a Soviet client, was to be lured into the process through acquiescence to its role in Lebanon. The resultant Syrian strangulation of Lebanon was not deemed worthy of any concern by the U.S. Government. 

However, the results of this decision is far from irrelevant. Control of Lebanon has provided the main stay of the Syrian economic independence and allowed for unnecessary delays in the peace process. Illegal operations, mainly in the Bekaa valley provide the Syrian economy with several billion dollars a year from the narcotics trade and the massive counterfeiting of U.S. currency. In addition control of Lebanese territory have allowed Syria to circumvent many of the international trade limitations imposed upon it by operating through Lebanon. Finally the terrorist and fundamentalist groups trained and operating in Lebanon provide Syria with a vital tool in its struggle against the U.S. lead peace process. 

More importantly the status quo supported by the U.S. is leading to a fundamental change in the Lebanese view of the situation. The past five years of relative lull on the Lebanese scene, have lead the Lebanese opposition to re-evaluate their situation and conduct some serious sole searching. 

The Lebanese have paid a heavy price for their pro-Western, pro-U.S. stance and continue to do so. They remain opposed to cooperating with Syrians in keeping with their commitment to the U.S. lead process for peace in the region. They believe that cooperation would only strengthen the anti-U.S. camp and provided with additional leverage against it. The Lebanese have in effect refrained from reconstructing their own country and its economy and are risking loosing everything in the process. 

Yet, this commitment does not seem to be reciprocal. The U.S. whose efforts the Lebanese are committed to, has repeatedly repudiated them. On several occasions, when concerns about the future of Lebanon or its ability to sustain the present conditions were brought to attention, U.S. officials have clearly stated that the issue is not one of concern and even eluded to the fact that Lebanon's survival in the post-war era may not be deemed important. 

In this light, Lebanese leaders and the public at large have begun to re-evaluate their commitment to a policy that does deem their mere survival as a priority. The Lebanese are thus, re-evaluating their relationship to Syria, which has been shaped by Syria's perception that the Lebanese would turn against and weaken its bargaining position. 

The Lebanese renowned for their survival skills are now viewing the subject in a different light. They believe that since the U.S. and its allies are not concerned with their survival, then any commitment to weakening their enemies, namely Syria is not worth their losses. The primary concern for the Lebanese is becoming the ability to lead a normal life and guarantee the nation's survival. 

As such, they have begun considering cooperation with the Syrian presence. It is believed that if the Syrians no longer perceive them as a threat they may unstrangle Lebanon and allow a full recovery, which would in turn benefit the Syrians. This will allow Lebanon to rebuild and allow the Lebanese to survive and wait out the regional developments. That this would strengthen the Syrian position and may threaten the peace process is becoming less of a concern since most see the process coming at their expense. 

If the U.S. Government officials still consider this not worthy of their concern, they should reflect on the implications of such a shift. 

Primarily it would imply the repatriation of tens of billions of dollars to Lebanon along with several hundred thousand highly skilled and highly trained professionals, coupled with a strong European involvement and some U.S. corporate participation, would quickly transform Lebanon into a vibrant economy. Under the circumstances, no longer leery of the Lebanese intentions Syria would allow for freer operations and would through its political control reap a great benefit from the process, primarily through its massive labor force participation and as a conduit to the rest of the region. This would further strengthen the Syrian intransigence against the peace process and the U.S. plan. 

Secondarily, a vibrant Lebanese economy would provide the Arab states, many of whom are leery of Israel's economic intentions with an alternative to the services and know-how of the Israelis, which would weaken their commitment to further integration of Israel into the region. 

Booth of these developments do not bode well for the U.S., which is counting on a successful implementation of the peace process to reap the economic benefits of a region in which it has substantial influence. The development of an alternate economic structure opposed to growing U.S. influence would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. efforts and minimize the resultant benefits.