SAVING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

A NEW APPROACH

2000

The recent escalations in South Lebanon and the consequent regional and international reactions underscore the fragility of the peace process and its perilous susceptibility to collapse, specially in light of the fast approaching July deadline for the Israeli declared withdrawal from Lebanon. Short of a miracle, the July deadline will pass without achieving a peace accord with either Lebanon or Syria.  

The scale of public and official outrage that resulted from Israel's bombardment of Lebanese power plants, has certainly bolstered Assad's belief that he has the ability to scuttle the peace process without risking regional isolation. In fact should the conflict in South Lebanon escalate, Assad stands to gain from opposing peace and retain the regional acquiescence to his continued occupation of Lebanon under the pretence of defending it against Israeli aggression. As such, the peace process and US interests are at great risk of a regional back lash unless an alternate approach is adopted to circumvent potential conflicts and avoid a collapse of the peace process. 

A Reality Check on Syria

The peace process has thus far pinned hopes for comprehensive peace on Assad's acquiescence to peace and his perceived ability to bring about an end to hostilities through his control of the radical and fundamentalist groups operating from within Syrian-occupied Lebanon. With Assad on board the peace train, those groups, it is believed, will be disarmed and disbanded, eliminating the last hot war front in the region and allowing peace to take root. 

In reality, Assad does not control fundamentalist and radical groups and conditions in Lebanon any more than those groups and conditions influence his actions and ability to maneuver. The Assad regime has thus far survived mainly through its championship of the anti-Israel cause and the garnering the support of those groups believed to be under his control. There is no strategic alliance in Assad's relationship with Islamic fundamentalists. Fundamentalists have reached a tactical alliance with the Assad regime due to their benefit from his support in fighting Israel and Western influence in the region. Furthermore, Assad's control over Lebanon and his status in the region is primarily due to this allegiance which brings his regime support and assistance. 

Should Assad abandon his anti-Israel stand and move to dismantle the armed groups he currently supports, he would not only loose his only leverage in regional politics and his ability to control Lebanon, which serves as Syria's iron lung, but will in fact become a target of the same people he has so far armed and trained. Countries that currently support Assad due to convergence of interests or fear of his terror network will turn their backs on his crumbling regime as it comes under attack from within. 

This reality is precisely why Assad has thus far used every trick to avoid reaching a peace agreement with Israel. A peace that will in no uncertain terms spell the end of his regime and dramatically reduce Syria's regional position. This is definitely not the legacy he aims to leave behind. 

The July Escape Hatch

The Israeli commitment to withdraw from Lebanon by July has given Assad an escape hatch to avoid entering into a peace accord that will almost certainly result in the end of his regime. Lacking the ability to effectively undo the peace process, Assad has for the past nine years proclaimed his "strategic commitment to the peace process" while avoiding any real progress and exerting all efforts to prevent progress on other fronts and recreate conditions of hostility and animosity. Given the regional drive towards peace Assad risked isolation if he openly opposed peace. Note however, his commitment to the "process" not the actual peace. 

Should July pass without a peace accord, Israel will face two options, to postpone its withdrawal or leave Lebanon unilaterally without an accord, neither of which bodes well for regional peace, Israel or US interests in the region. A postponed withdrawal will play directly into the hands of the enemies of peace, who will point out the postponement as an indication that Israel does not want peace and use it to rally public opposition to continued negotiations. Compounding the argument with military escalation that will be justified by the remaining forces and pointing out repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon, public outrage in the region would build to a level that will force governments to re-evaluate their positions regarding the peace process and Israel. 

On the other hand if Israel withdraws unilaterally without a formal mechanism for transition of territory to Lebanese authorities, it will leave the door wide open for its enemies to launch attacks on Israel, drawing retaliation and sending the whole region into a tail spin which will further strain relations between Israel and its neighbors and eliminate hopes for peace in the near future. Counting on Assad to Reign in the terrorists and prevent such an outcome is wishful thinking, given the realities of his regime and the risks he will face if the peace process succeeds. 

The Syrian regime has accepted to attend the Washington meeting in December, specifically so that they can claim that they aimed for peace and blame the failure on Israel to garner Arab and Islamic support in the coming months. On-going secret negotiations are yet another play for time and public opinion, leading to the July deadline. Assad will maintain the communication lines open until he arrives at his golden opportunity to break off talks with the blessing and popular support from throughout the Arab and Islamic world. 

The Palestinian State

Shortly after the July test, will come the September declaration of an independent Palestinian state. With anti-Israeli sentiments in high gear, no Arab or Islamic country will be able to resist public sentiment to support such a declaration. Any Israeli or US opposition to the declaration will be hailed as another example of mulintension and used to fan further public animosity and opposition.  

The two developments will most definitely halt any progress on the peace front and send the whole region into a tail spin. The peace process will end, having only resulted in handing over parts of the West bank and Gaza to the Palestinians from which they could wage another low intensity war against Israel. 

US Interests

A failure of the peace process puts US interests into a highly precarious position, as a failure of the Middle East peace process will badly damage US credibility and the region's perception of the US ability to bring about desired change. Even a cold rift between Arabs and Israel will force the US to choose between its alliance with Israel and its pursuit of its economic interests in the Arab World. We may not see a return to the days of boycotts and banning of US businesses, but, should the region revert to a state of conflict, current conditions that allow the US to provide unlimited support to Israel while pursuing lucrative businesses in the region will give way to cold shoulders and limited economic access, not to mention the risks from increased attacks on US interests and personnel by fundamentalist movements. Other global players will be more than happy to fill the void left by the US. 

Saving the Peace Process

In spite of the dire conditions of the peace process, all has not been lost yet. An alternate approach exists that can defuse the South Lebanon time-bomb and resolve one of the toughest issues of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, leading to a resumption of negotiations and attainment of regional peace.  

The alternative has been in plain view for over 22 years, but, has been ignored out of consideration for those who pretended to champion peace while working to prevent it. UN resolutions on Lebanon and the mechanisms to implement them will, if the international community musters the courage to act on them, defuse the conflict in South Lebanon and rob the enemies of peace of their ability to scuttle the process. Furthermore, resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem in Lebanon and neutralizing Iranian opposition to peace will eliminate all disputes between Israel and Lebanon and remove the means through which the conflict can be maintained. Without Iranian support and the cooperation of the Lebanese Shiite community and Palestinian radicals, Assad will loose his ability to oppose a peaceful settlement on the Lebanese-Israeli front. 

UN resolution 425, 426, 520 and many others clearly spell out the roles and means of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon along with the withdrawal of all other non-Lebanese forces. The resolutions also forbid any regular or irregular armed forces from launching attacks against one country from or through the other country. UNIFIL forces have been on the ground in Lebanon for 22 years for the express purpose of facilitating withdrawal and providing transitional security as territory is transferred between occupation forces and Lebanese authority. The UNIFIL also has as part of its mandate to assist the Lebanese authorities in gaining full control of its territory, disarming any irregular militias and evicting non-Lebanese forces. 

Since the UN resolutions are already in place and are unanimously called for, by regional and international leaders, UN action does not require any official request from Lebanon or elsewhere. Lebanon under Syrian hegemony will not be forthcoming in requesting implementation of UN resolutions, as such implementation will rob Assad from his ability to scuttle the peace process in July. According to Lebanon's Prime Minister Hoss, he was advised not to file a complaint with the UN this month as in June since the UN response would be harmful to Lebanon and Syria's interests. It is obvious that the Syria's interests are at stake and Lebanon's interests are naturally subservient to its overlord. 

The UN should take a firm stand to implement its resolutions regarding Lebanon in all their details under penalty of reprisals against those who obstruct its implementation that are no less severe than those imposed on other countries, such as Iraq or Yugoslavia.  

The international community should also devise a plan to disperse most, if not all of the estimated 450,000 Palestinian refugees from Lebanon. The refugees amount to more than ten percent of the Lebanese population, or the equivalent of more than 30 million refugees in the US. No country, specially one emerging from war can absorb such a refugee influx. And this not considering the effect those refugees will have on Lebanon's internal balance and the potential for future problems. Several states have expressed their willingness to accept a portion of the refugees or contribute to the cost resettlement. 

The Iranian Factor

Recent changes in Iran have set the stage for a new era of Iranian relations within the region and internationally. Iran's opposition to the peace process have been born by two factors, the first being the fundamentalist opposition to Israel, which recent elections have shown to be on the decline. The other factor is Iran's perception - not totally unjustified - that the peace process aims to isolate Iran regionally. Should relations with Iran take a positive turns to indicate that its isolation is no longer an ulterior aim of the peace process such an opposition will subside. Believing that it has a role in a post-peace Middle East, specifically through its strong relations with Shiite communities such as Lebanon's, Iran may in fact turn into a supporter of implementing UN resolutions in Lebanon that would allow its Lebanese allies to participate in the political life of a prosperous nation that will offer it a window into the region's political and economic mainstream. 

The Iran of the 80s, which aimed to export its Islamic revolution throughout the region and dominating regional politics has given way to more pragmatic political aims of a leading role within the existing structure. Sectarian barriers to Shiite domination of predominantly Sunni arab countries has proven too strong to penetrate. In addition the socio-economic decline in Iran has not proven too encouraging for others to aim to emulate. The Iranian Government has recently been exerting every effort to re-integrate itself in the regional geopolitical mainstream.  

Today's fundamentalist threat emanates primarily from Sunni groups operating in North Africa and Central Asia. Those groups have a stronger chance of successfully infiltrating the Sunni Moslem populations of the Arab world and Turkey and disrupting the current geopolitical structure. Iran is now itself at risk from those groups as Sunnis represent 90% of the Moslem world and will overwhelm the Shiite minority. Thus Iran's inclusion in the new Middle East regional structure, would add a level of defense against Sunni Moslem dominance in the current circle of peace and result in a more diverse region that is less likely to become polarized, providing a much more conducive environment for minorities like Christians of Lebanon or the Jews of Israel. Openness to Iran will also reduce the potential risk resurgent Arabist sentiments from a re-emergent Iraq.  

Effects on the Lebanese-Israeli Track

The full implementation of UN resolutions and the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem will eliminate all causes for conflict along the Lebanese-Israeli border. No Lebanese, not even the Shiite population will accept that Hizbullah or others launch attacks across the border and draw Israeli fire. The Lebanese have endured war for far too long and will not willingly accept the instigation of any further suffering,  

Thus, absence Syrian occupation that usurps Lebanese authority and Iranian instigation under Syria's occupation umbrella and absent a compelling reason for conflict due to occupation or the Palestinian refugee issue, the Lebanese will go to great lengths to avert further conflict. Even Hizbullah, will join the peaceful march as it works to capitalize on the good will it has built to partake in the country's political and economic life. 

Even if Lebanon cannot enter into a formal peace accord with Israel before the other tracks are resolved, Lebanon and Israel will at least return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement as stipulated by the UN resolutions. Lebanon will no longer serve as the venue to scuttle the other venues, providing a more conducive atmosphere for true peaceful negotiations. 

Effects on Arab Public Opinion

The continued conflict in South Lebanon plays into the hands of the enemies of peace as it rouses public opinion against Israel and the peace process, forcing leaders and Government to take a hard line stands, as evidenced in the past three weeks. An end to the military conflict, and thus, news of suffering in Lebanon, will pave the way for a more conciliatory public opinion that is more accepting of a peaceful settlement. Regional leaders are better positioned to discuss peace if their public is not constantly faced with blaring reports and statements about Israel's brutal attacks. 

Effects on the Syrian Track

Having lost its Lebanese card and the associated terror network it maintains on Lebanese soil and deprived from its Iranian ally in its opposition to peace, Syria will no longer have the means to disrupt regional peace or threaten those who are engaged in the process. Syria will face two options, either enter into honest negotiations to reach a peace settlement or risk regional isolation and loss of regional economic and political support which are crucial to its survival.  

Thus, by resolving the Lebanese issue, the Syrian-Israeli conflict becomes much easier to conclude. The Syrians will be extremely reluctant to initiate cross border hostilities from Syria and endure the type of Israeli retaliation that they have subjected the Lebanese to over the years. 

Effects on the Palestinian Track

Without pressure from Syria against the Palestinians and Jordan, which holds substantial influence over the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, this track will be allowed to move forward based on its own merits rather than being delayed and disrupted by other conflicts. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the US take the lead in this approach that would cement US credibility in the Middle East and lead to a peaceful settlement, which will greatly enhance US interests in the region. 

1 -        Initiate and effort by the UN to implement all UN resolution on Lebanon and support the strengthening of the UNIFIL forces as a mechanism to ensure proper implementation. 

2 -        Initiate a multi-national effort, potentially through the UN, to resettle the Palestinian refugees out of Lebanon, recruiting host countries and financing for the re-settlements. 

3 -        Initiate a new approach towards the emerging moderate Iranian leadership that resulted from recent elections that would reduce tensions between Iran and the West and between Iran and its neighbors to turn Iran's opposition to regional peace into a support of the new regional structure in which Iran can take its place in a non-confrontational relationship.