THE END GAME

NEGOTIATING THE SYRIAN & LEBANESE TRACKS

December 30, 1999 

INTRODUCTION

The United States, as the facilitator and mediator of the Madrid Conference Peace Process and as the possible eventual guarantor of whatever agreements are reached, must for the sake of the durability of what is wrought, stand for the integrity of the process by insisting upon a process that respects the sovereignty of each party to it.  The United States should not concede at the outset that since Lebanon  is perceived now as the junior partner to Syria that this perception should persist and become enshrined in the reality of an eventual treaty.   

The seeming expediency by which Syria and Israel are following  such a course in concluding treaties for both Syria and Lebanon will defeat the purpose of the exercise. The peace treaties are not an end of themselves, but only the foundations upon which peace will be built by the parties themselves.  The parties must build with firm footing in the accords.  Flaws in the foundation will defeat the peace. The time to detect the potential flaws and eradicate them from the foundation is now at the end game of the negotiations. The following analysis of potential outcomes exposes the inherent flaws in the course that has apparently beenset between Syria and Israel which impacts yet ignores Lebanon. 

I CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

A.      Lebanon - The Quid Pro Quo between Syria and Israel  The basis of the bargain which has brought Israel and Syria back to the bargaining table appears to be the following:  Israel, in order to arrive at a peace treaty with Syria is willing to return to Syrian sovereignty, the plateau of the Golan Heights.  Israel wishes to retain the slope from the plateau to the banks of the Sea of Galilee, which had previously been Syrian territory, as well as listening posts on Mount Herman, which also was previous Syrian national territory. In exchange, Israel wants peace on its northern border.  It wants an end to Hezbollah attacks from southern Lebanon and it wants to deal with the party most able to deliver the guarantee of security on its border at the lowest cost in strategic terms.  Press reports seem to indicate that the Israelis prefer the Syrian guarantee to the Lebanese guarantee along Israeli's common border with Lebanon.  Those reports seem to indicate that Israeli policy, always firmly grounded in hard reality, sees the Syrian regime as the real power with the track record of ability to control Hezbollah and it sees the Syrian army as the more capable in dealing harshly to carry out the policy of the Syrian regime.  In the Israeli view, if, through the peace process, they could obtain the commitment of Syria to givet his guarantee, then they would wed the ability to the willingness that security be so achieved through the Syrian-Israeli negotiation track. 

B.      The Conventional Wisdom on Lebanon Guaranteeing Security on its Border with Israel.    This position is fortified when the alternative, of looking to the Lebanese for the guarantee is evaluated.

a.      The cost to the Israelis would be higher.  The Lebanese have let it be known from all quarters that it does not wish to be saddled with there settlement of the Palestinian refugees as an outcome of the negotiations. They have likewise made it clear that they view the Hezbollah resistance in the south as the only leverage Lebanon has with Israel to force the a more favorable resolution of the Palestinian issue with Israel. Thus from the Israeli point of view, by going through Beirut to solve its problem with Hezbollah, the price will be higher in terms of being forced to deal with the refugee issue now rather than as a part of the Final Status talks with the PA.  Syria on the other hand has placed no quid pro quo condition regarding resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue on its willingness to impose a Syrian military guarantee on ending Hezbollah military activity against Israel from Lebanon.

b.      Israel regards Lebanon as a lightweight country without an independent political decision making apparatus within the institutions of its government.  Lebanon is instead considered, in the cold light of Israeli analysis, as being a Syrian appendage.  Israelis never deal with the agent, always with the principal.

c.      The Lebanese Army, only relatively recently reconstituted following the Lebanon War, may not prove stable enough over the long run to  repress the Hezbollah in the south. With many conscripts in the Lebanese Army ranks being co-religionists with the Hezbollah fighters, loyalty to Lebanese command and control from Beirut is suspect in the eyes of the Israelis. There is no such conflict with elements of the Syrian army to ruthlessly carry out orders from Damascus and thus provide a better guarantee of peace on Israel's border with Lebanon. 

C.      The Israeli Outcome per Conventional Wisdom.  Thus, the conventional wisdom goes, Israel can emerge from the Syrian talks with the following results:

a.      Though the Golan Heights would have been returned to Syrian sovereignty, the wine growing slopes and the high ground of Mount Herman would be retained thus securing an Israeli industry, wine making, and providing for Israeli security with the high tech listening posts to be established on Mount Herman.  The losers here will be Israeli  settlers on the Golan who have been determined to be expendable to the peace process.

b.      Barak will have, secured peace on his border with Lebanon and obtained a Syrian guarantee that the Hezbollah will be liquidated as a military force. Thus the costly Israeli maintained Security Zone in southern Lebanon can be dismantled and Barak can keep his campaign promise to “Bring the Boys Home”.

c.      Barak will have accomplished his primary objectives with regard to Lebanon without having to address the potentially explosive issue of dealing with the Palestinian refugee issue.

D.      The Syrian Outcome - per Conventional Wisdom. Further, according to conventional wisdom, Syria can emerge from the talks with the following results:

a.      Assad can claim that he has won back the Golan Heights.

b.      Assad can demand from the Israelis that if they wish Syria to guarantee peace on the border between Lebanon and Israel, that Syria should be compensated somehow, either with annual appropriations of aid from the United States, and end to United States classification of Syria as a terrorist sponsoring state, or some other form of compensation, including guarantees that neither the United States nor Israel would engage in any effort to unseat his chosen successor, his son Bashar.

c.      Assad would have under such a peace regime, a new and firm rationale for Syria to maintain an even stronger military and security  presence inside of Lebanon, that being in order to carry out its commitments to the Israelis of maintaining peace on its border with Lebanon.

d.      Assad could thus emerge with a credible return of the Golan, and retention as well as international reaffirmation of his hegemony over Lebanon thus bringing Lebanon further into the Syrian orbit and moving it to eventual merger with the Syrian state. 

II. THE ISSUE - IS CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WISE?

The question, and the point of this analysis, is:  Should the United States sanction the conventional wisdom outlined above and the likely outcome that it will produce, by allowing it to be enshrined in a peace treaty that will be executed under American auspices and with an American guarantee?  

Setting aside for the moment American ideals of freedom and self determination, which such a scenario would deny to the people and the Republic of Lebanon, from a practical interest analysis of the parties involved, such an outcome is not in the interests of the United States nor of Israel.  The flaw in the basic assumption of the conventional thinking, going into the Syrian - Israeli Talks, that Syria rather than Lebanon is the better guarantor of security along the Lebanon-Israeli border, is that it is backwards looking with regard to the Syrian regime rather than forward looking out into the future. It also overlooks the major changes in the political landscape that will be created by a peace accord. It is a basic strategic error to extrapolate a future set of expectations of the Syrian regime based on past performance of the regime of Hafez al Assad.  While he may negotiate the treaty, he will not be in power when Syria is called upon to meet the obligations so imposed, nor will the Syrian position and everage be the same, particularly vis-a-vis Lebanon and the fundamentalist and radical militias Syria currently supports there. 

A.      Which Syrian Regime will Carry out the Treaty?

What appears strong and stable today, will not be so tomorrow. The Syrian regime of Hafez al Assad has, in the past, been perceived as a more favorable guarantor of agreements with Israel because of the personality of Hafez al Assad.  Commentators are relatively in agreement that no other personality in the history of Syria, at least in the modern era, has been able to impose order on that country as has Hafez al Assad.  It is a one man regime.  This has made of Syria an asset in the minds of strategic thinkers in Israel and the United States.  Whatever has been needed from Syria, we only had to deal with one man, Hafez al Assad, and no one else.  His word has been sufficient to make things happen in Syria and in Lebanon.  However, this asset relied upon in the past will quickly become a liability in the future. What of the future?  All agree that Assad is on his way out and is busy with succession issues on behalf of his son Bashar.  Currently, Bashar enjoys the respect of most factions in Syria, however, this is more out of fear of his ruthless father than any inherent ability displayed by Bashar who, until recently, was an ophthalmologist with his office in London.  All agree that Bashar lacks his father's and late brother's ruthless and shrewd characteristics to command the fearful deference that his father possesses and which his deceased brother once had. Internal conflicts are already brewing with regular bloody clashes between supporters of Bashar and his contenders, including Hafez's brother Rifaat.   Succession in Syria will not be as it was in Jordan.  The United States and Israel make a critical error in strategic thinking to analogize the Syrian transition to that which occurred in Jordan in February 1999 when Prince Abdullah succeeded King Hussein.  Hussein was generally loved by his people and the affection for the King was transferred to his son and heir, Abdullah, who, in his own right, has displayed the same qualities of Hussein in managing the affairs of state for the Hashemite  Kingdom.  In addition, Hussein was a sharif,  that is, one entrusted with protection of the holy places of Islam, and kings are expected to pass the throne to their heirs. In contrast, Assad has earned the deference of the Syrian people not by the benevolence of his leadership but by sheer ruthlessness.  The lessons of1982 and the brutal repression of the Islamic Brotherhood at Hama have not been lost on the Syrian people.  The apparatus of Syrian security forces compel compliance to Alawite rule in Syria.  Assad's leaving power will not confer any love or affection to his son.  Rather his leaving will be more akin to the leaving of Coucescu in Romania.  His leaving power may well trigger a struggle for succession and  a return to political instability inthat country despite Assad's best efforts made on behalf of his son.  Assad is no sharif. Succession even within the Alawite and the Assad family is a contentious one. In addition, the Alawites of Syria are a despised minority in the eyes of the majority Sunni Moslem population which yet remembers Hama and will no doubt take advantage of an internal power struggle among the Alawites to take their revenge upon them and all of their allies in Syria. 

B.      Will Syria Retain the Levers of Power that It has Used and Exercised in the Past? 

Another error stems from assuming that Syria's leverage over Lebanon would survive a peace accord. Syria's control within Lebanon currently hinges on two classes of tactical allies who see a benefit from working with the Syrian regime and its current policy of confrontation with Israel.  Peace between Israel and Syria, one that Syria is obligated to guarantee along the Lebanese border, puts that rationale on its head. Without it, there is no other rationale upon which Syria can base its occupation and claim of control over events in Lebanon.  Absent that policy and the rationale that it provides to bring Syria tactical Lebanese allies, Syria lacks any strategic or long term allies within the Lebanon's political apparatus or among the Lebanese people. 

III. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM - PEACE MAKING THAT IS DURABLE INTO THE FUTURE?

A.      Placing All of Israel's Eggs into an Uncertain Syrian Basket.  The obligations assumed by Assad on behalf of Syria in a peace with Israel must be considered assuming that Assad will not be in power to enforce them and no one knows whether the successor regime to Assad will be in any position to meet those obligations.  Since 1970, Assad has been Syria.  The word of Hafez al Assad has been writ. Assad has overcome Islamic rejection of his Alawite regime and mustered a powerful position in the region by championing the rejectionist front and cultivating the radical and fundamentalist movements in the region with his support and assistance.  However, the 180ºchange in Syrian policy toward Israel, which peace will bring; an exit of Hafez al Assad from power; and an end to the tactical alliances formed by Assad with the rejectionists and fundamentalists to execute his confrontational policy toward Israel in Lebanon, will mean that the assumptions made in the past with regard to the stability and reliability of Syria suddenly become highly suspect.  It is the future regime of Syria, after all, not the regime of Hafez al Assad, which must keep to the terms and enforce the guarantees that Assad will make and it must do so under a completely different set of circumstances.  It is extremely dangerous forIsrael to place its security into the hands of a successor regime to Hafezal Assad that may not be able to even guarantee its hold on power in Syria much less provide security for Israel across its entire northern border, including that with Lebanon.

B.      Sowing the seeds of future instability. Assigning to the Syrian Army the role of guarantor of stability and peace across Israel’s northern border with Syria as well as with  Lebanon will, in spite of its short term stabilizing effect, set the stage for instability and conflict in Lebanon and cause problems for Israel, Syria and the region.  

Having “ousted” Israel from south Lebanon and being deprived of any meaningful political activity outside the strict dictat of the Syrian regime, Hizbullah and other Islamic movements will have no interest in a continued Syrian presence in Lebanon and, like their Christian counterparts, would be seeking ways to end the occupation.  For the first time in years, the interests of the various segments of the Lebanese society will converge on a single goal, namely to undo an accord that will have left them all oppressed and powerless. The differences between the Lebanese are primarily related to gaining an upper hand within the country's body politic. This basis of competition will become moot should Lebanon become a complete vassal state to Syria and a dumping ground for Israel’s Palestinian refugee problem. Furthermore, the Palestinians in Lebanon would have no interest in abiding by an accord that deprives them from their right to return to their native country and they, too, would be striving to undo such an accord. The situation would be further aggravated by the potential exodus of the wealthy and educated from Lebanon, primarily the Christians. 

Despite the exhortations of U.S. Ambassador David Satterfield to the Lebanese to return home, repatriate their wealth and rebuild their country, the Lebanese remain economic realists.  They will await the results of the peace before making their decision. Such an accord, based on conventional wisdom, will send a clear signal to those Lebanese that the peace process will end with the country permanently occupied by the Syrian Army and the Palestinians permanently settled in Lebanon.  Their predicted response will be to leave the country in droves.  The Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir has clearly indicated as much.  The Lebanese Christians hold a great deal of the private wealth of the country and are a moderating element within the body politic. They are a significant sector of the economic middle classes in Lebanon. Their departure will create a permanent demographic shift in Lebanon that is more Islamic and more toward the lower economic classes, especially when considering that large numbers of the Moslem upper economic classes will depart with them to escape being trapped under Syrian dictatorial policies that further destroy what is left of the economy. Lebanon would be crippled. Its population generally poorer, saddled with a growing stateless Palestinian refugee population and under military occupation, Lebanon would become very unstable and ripe for fundamentalists or extremists of whatever stripe to come in, exploit the situation and create security problems for Israel and Syria.  

Such an outcome, one that would place an entire country in the political and economic backwater as the dumping ground of every other state's intractable problems, can only sow the seeds of future instability.  Lebanon and her people would have no reason whatsoever to comply with the terms of an agreement imposed on their backs and at their expense.  They would have no stake in its success.  Rather, they would have every incentive in working towards its eventual undoing.  Where people have nothing to lose in a certain status quo it is much easier to convince them to challenge it by whatever means especially if the status quo is a particularly oppressive one, as this outcome can so foreseeably be for the Lebanese. 

IV.  REAL PEACE

A.      Peace That Leads to Democratization Not Radicalization.   Israel, for this peace process to produce the dividends of peace, should be working toward a result that places on her borders countries that practice market economics and that are developing into democratic states.  For at the end of the day, true peace and real security for Israel will not come with the stroke of anyone’s pen, but it will come when the neighborhood in which it exists becomes a democratic neighborhood.  Democracies do not wage war on each other.  Of all of Israel’s neighbors, Lebanon now is the closest to being a true working republic but only because those elements of her population which demand such rights have hung in throughout 20 years of war and the subsequent 10 years of Syrian occupation, hoping for a peace that would restore sovereignty to their country and allow for the rebirth of representative government. Peace along the lines contemplated by conventional wisdom as set out above, will cut the legs out from under this sector of the Lebanese population and rather than producing a peaceful democratic Lebanon on Israel's northern border will more likely produce a country whose people will be more susceptible than ever to radicalization and rationalizations that include violence as a means of change.

B.      A Peace that Diversifies the Security Risk - Giving Peace Two Chances. Peace along the lines contemplated by conventional wisdom as set out above will place far too much of Israel's future security into the hands of a future Syrian regime that may not be able to secure its own hold on power much less guarantee the security for the State of Israel along Israel’s border with Lebanon.  Therefore, regardless of how much the Syrians may protest, there should be a  limit to the obligations accepted by them.  By limiting the Syrian regime to assuming treaty obligations to be strictly executed within Syrian national boundaries and leaving to the Lebanese the obligation of enforcing the terms of the treaty required to be executed within Lebanese national boundaries, the Israelis can hedge their security risks by giving peace two chances to work.  Should there be instability in Syria, that instability would not be translated across the entire length of Israel's northern border, only along its border with Syria in the Golan where Israel is already taking independent security precautions.  The Lebanese side of the border would remain otherwise stable and in the hands of an independent Lebanese government in Beirut. Hezbollah has already committed, through representations made by Sheik Naeem Kassem in July 1998 that it would be “a sin” for the Hezbollah to engage in armed conflict with the Lebanese Army and there is universal support within Lebanon for the Army to take action against any potential Palestinian efforts to disrupt a future peace along the border with Israel.  Kassim did not state that such a sin would result from an armed conflict with the Syrian Army and there would not be a similar Lebanese consensus supporting a Syrian repression of Palestinian efforts to undo a peace that left them out.

C.      A Peace that Addresses the Causes of the War. Under a true and just peace that grants Lebanon the same rights afforded to all other countries in the region, Hizbullah and other militias will not require a massive military operation to be disarmed.  Hezbollah has already set a strategic course for political integration into the Lebanese body politic as a political force that will have been justified by its armed “resistance” against Israel. Currently, the Lebanese endure the warfare in the South and accept Hizbullah's military activity either due to pressure from the Syrian overlords or due to a belief that it is the only leverage the Lebanese possess to force Israel to respond to its negotiation objectives, mainly dealing with the fate of the Palestinian refugees currently in Lebanon. Should Israel withdraw from Lebanon under terms independently negotiated by the Lebanese, then no Lebanese, not even the Shiite community will allow military activity along the border that would violate such a peace and draw Israeli retaliation, causing additional deaths and suffering to their fellow Lebanese. 

V. THE ROLE of the UNITED STATES

It is therefore left to the United States to stand for the integrity of the process and the sovereignty of each party to the process.  The United States must work to insure that the resulting peace accord does not lead to radicalization of the region and set the stage for future wars which ignoring the sovereignty of any party will produce. The US should guide the course of the Talks so that the parties enter into accords which will foster the emergence of moderating forces, including minorities and educated upper classes within the counties that are to be Israel’s treaty partners. Their presence within the states neighboring Israel are essential to insure that the Middle East which emerges from the peace process will be democratic, forward looking and have a vested interest and commitment to the peace, not radical, impoverished and seeking avenues of revenge.  U.S. leverage in terms of withholding aid, refusing to remove certain states from the status of terrorist sponsoring states and other means uniquely available to the United States must be used to enforce upon the parties terms which enhance durability of the accords.  

Peace is not easy and should not be made easy by taking short cuts.  Such a peace will have no durability.  Peace will be difficult and for it to be durable, the weakest links in the peace chain must be strengthened, not further weakened and crippled.  Such a peace would have no durability. Lebanon, not Israel or Syria is the weak link.  The peace will be only as strong and as lasting as is Lebanon. The benefits of peace are thus dependant on the true essence of the accord not the expediency and ease with which we attain it. Should the world community, led by the United States rush into an agreement that ignores the fundamental principles of peace of freedom and self determination for all peoples, then the future will not bring the fruits of a peaceful region but rather will witness great suffering from conflicts waged to correct the injustices of an expedient peace.  

Prepared and distributed by the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans Policy Group, Toufic Baaklini, Washington, D.C., Ziad Nassar, Atlanta GA., Joseph L. Boohaker, Chairman, Birmingham, AL, Toufic Nassif, President London, UK. Copywright © 1999.  E-mail pkmc83a@mindspring.com