THE CASE TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTION 425

May 10, 1998                       

Israel's Adoption of SCR 425

On April 1, 1998, after months of internal debate, the Israeli cabinet adopted a resolution to comply with UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 425 calling for its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanese territory.  This act has touched off frantic diplomatic back filling by the Syrian government. The Lebanese Government, before  receiving the official text of the Israeli UN Representative's letter which had been delivered to the UN Secretary General, dutifully rejected the Israeli proposal because Syria objects to the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.  Syrian diplomats have sought support for its position from Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the GCC, France and England as it has launched a full court press against the Israeli action. 

The Israeli proposal, as outlined in Israel's brief letter to the Secretary General, while welcome, was guaranteed to generate the negative reaction that it has drawn from Syria.  The Syrians see the  Israeli "conditions" are extraneous, and indeed, they are to a certain extent.  When considered within its proper  diplomatic context, SCR 426 already references all of the security arrangements that Israel is seeking to make as conditions for the implementation of Resolution 425. 

The Historical and Diplomatic Context of SCR 425 &426.

The two resolutions, indeed have a historical context that predates their March 1978 adoption by the Security Council.  At issue is Israel's  withdrawal from Lebanese territory.  But with the two states not sharing  diplomatic recognition, what is the historical reference defining the points to which Israel is to withdraw? 

The 1949 Armistice Accord. 

In 1948, when the United Nations voted to partition Palestine and  create the State of Israel, the new state's northern frontier was the  former boundary between the British and French Mandate territories. Lebanon participated with other Arab states in the first Arab-Israeli military confrontation by actually crossing the old mandate line and engaging in military action around the town of Malikiah (now renamed Kyriat Schimona) prior to withdrawing back into Lebanon.  The withdrawal was followed by a UN sponsored negotiation which  resulted in the March 1949 Armistice Accord.  This Accord, signed by  military representatives of both Lebanon and Israel, among other things,  formalized the old Mandate frontier as the "armistice demarcation line" between the two states until such time as diplomatic recognition can take place and the boundary formally adopted.  It also provided the following, contained in Articles I and III, which could not be unilaterally nor mutually modified by the parties: 

From Article I:  "No aggressive action by the armed forces - air, sea or land - of either Party shall be undertaken, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other. . ." 

From Article III:  "No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line as set forth in Article V of this agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party. 

No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party." 

Lebanon's Lapse into Militia Rule and Inability to Comply. 

Lebanon has repeatedly and officially declared its adherence to the Armistice.  The Lebanese Government however, having acquiesced to the 1969 Cairo Accord and its 1973 Melkart Corollary, essentially turned over those border territories to PLO control .  The Lebanese government thus lost control of the southern border area and ceased policing the observance of the Accord.

Due to Lebanon's having fallen under a combined PLO, Syrian and  militia rule from 1975-1990, and Israel having also taken to supporting militias in Lebanon, the Israelis essentially had no counterpart in Lebanon, other than one of their own supported militias, the SLA, which it could hold accountable for adherence to the obligations set forth and agreed upon in 1949.  Israel over time and in response to the chaotic situation in Lebanon had thus resorted to self help methods of providing security on its northern border, first against PLO cross border attacks, then against Hezbollah attacks. 

Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. 

In 1978 Israel launched its first major incursion into Lebanon to attack PLO bases that had built up over the previous five years.  This action  resulted in the adoption of UN Resolutions 425 and 426 during that year.  The 1949 Armistice Accord was attached as "Annex I" to UN Resolution 425.  It provides the context for the resolution.  The point of reference for Israeli withdrawal is the armistice demarcation line which is defined in the Armistice Accord.  The very purpose of UN 425 is to return the two states to the status quo ante bellum, defined as that state of affairs that existed under the 1949 Armistice Accord, of mutual respect for the respective territories of the two states and a prohibition of cross border raids and assaults pending formal diplomatic recognition. 

Though successive Lebanese governments since 1978 have demanded Israeli compliance with 425, no government has expressed the political will or ability to control first the PLO, then Hezbollah from waging low intensity warfare against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon.  The Israeli government, appreciating the reality of this situation, has to date, chosen not to hold the Lebanese government responsible for actions emanating from its southern territories, and instead has chosen to  assume responsibility for security on both sides of the frontier.  

The convenience of having Israeli military units available for attack outside of Israeli national territory has not been lost on Syrian President Hafez al Asad who has taken full advantage of the exposure to score political points with his Arab brethren at Israel's expense. 

Israeli Adoption of SCR 425 Breaths Life into Previous International Agreements.

The Israelis, if they are indeed serious about a withdrawal from Lebanese territory, need not be deterred by Syrian objections. Lebanon, Syria and Israel are all member states of the UN.  The proposed Israeli withdrawal is to be undertaken pursuant to a UN Resolution across a  demarcation line established by a UN supervised Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Accord and the UN Resolutions have been obsolete for decades due to Lebanon's inability to enforce the terms of the Armistice since 1975, and Israeli non-recognition of 425 and 426 in deference to its security needs since 1978.  Israeli adoption of SCR 425, now breaths new life into these old agreements that have been on the shelves. Resolution 426, adopted with 425 states the following: 

"The Security Council approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of March 19, 1978 . . ." 

The document referenced is attached to Resolution 425 as "Annex II" and provides under its General Considerations provisions: 

"The Force (UNIFIL) is being established on the assumption that it represents an interim measure until the government of Lebanon assumes its full responsibilities in southern Lebanon.  The termination of the mandate of UNIFIL by the Security Council will not affect the continued functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, as set out in the appropriate Security Council decision." 

The "Mixed Armistice Commission" referenced in Annex II is a body created in the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which is "Annex I" to UN Resolution 425.  Israel, by adopting  UN Resolution 425, adopts the Annexes to it and therein are contained all security conditions which the Israelis now demand.   

Renegotiation with the Lebanese government is not required. The international commitments of the Lebanese government are already contained in the documents referenced by and to UN Resolution 425.  The means and methods of enforcement are in need of updating.  The Armistice is 50 years old and SCR 425 is now 20 years old.  However, Israel need only negotiate these matters  with the UN, not directly with Lebanon. 

In the wake of an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, UNIFIL is the logical force to provide security in the area until the Lebanese government deploys its own security forces to the south and assumes those duties as required by SCR 425, 426 and the Annexes thereto.  Israel, which has solicited assistance from France in this international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area;" 

The UN would then negotiate with the Lebanese regarding logistics and other security measures so as to turn over UNIFIL duties to Lebanese authorities.  Then, as specified in the Terms of Reference cited above under paragraph 2(e): 

"In the fulfillment of this task, the Force (UNIFIL) will have the cooperation of the Military Observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), who will continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of UNIFIL." 

In this way, Israeli security concerns can more realistically be addressed and met rather than by Israeli rhetorical exhortations to the Lebanese government to enter into negotiations which the Israelis are fully aware the Lebanese government is not at liberty to enter. 

Lebanon's Interest in Compliance with SCR 425 & Its Annexes.

Overcoming the Syrian Veto. Lebanon, for its part,  has allegedly  re-established its national government under a Second Republic defined by the terms of the 1989 Taif Accord sponsored by the Arab League.  The Accord calls upon the Lebanese government to reassert its national authority throughout its territory.  Southern Lebanon was not exempted from this mandate.   

If Lebanon were truly independent; had the Taif Accord been fully implemented, Lebanon, like any other free country would have immediately welcomed the Israeli proposal.   But because Taif Accord implementation was left open to Syrian manipulation and exploitation, Lebanon, instead has emerged from its internal chaotic struggle of 1975-1990 as a vassal Syrian state with its own national interests subordinated to those of Syria.  Unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, though very much in Lebanon's national interest,  runs counter to Syrian national interests.  Therefore the Israeli proposal must be couched in terms to overcome the Syrian veto and thus force to government in Beirut to do that which any other sovereign state would otherwise undertake. 

The subservient, dependent reality of the Lebanese government toward Syria is masked by the superficial appearance of a national government in Beirut.  It is a government incapable of independent decision making which may run counter to Syrian national interests, even when Lebanese national interests cry out for action, as is the case with the Israeli proposal. 

The Free Ride of the Newly Constituted Lebanese Government.

The current government of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri is therefore an enigma.  It is accorded all of the formalities of a legitimate government of an independent state, yet none of the presumptions.  No one presumes this government capable of independent decision making on behalf of Lebanese national interests and so it is under no pressure to so act.   In effect, the officers of this government have been given a free ride by the international community.  They are not held accountable to assume the same duties and responsibilities of other heads of state and other governments, yet they enjoy all of the trappings of office.    No other state would allow armed militia, which operate outside of the legitimate force structure of the state, to conduct military operations against a neighboring state, provoking retaliatory raids against its sovereign territory.   

Yet the Lebanese do with regard to Hezbollah military operations in the south as well as with regard to a score of small Palestinian organizations loyal to Damascus.  Prime Minister Hariri, on the May 6 observance of "Martyr's Day" praised the "resistance effort" of Hezbollah military operations in southern Lebanon, thus condoning the violation of the very UN Resolution that he seeks to enforce against Israel, "unconditionally".  Yet, there is no credible sanction imposed against his government. 

Israeli Recognition of the Reality of  Hariri's Government.

The Israelis have been visibly forgiving toward the Lebanese government and have not held it responsible for Hezbollah military activity.  Even in battles last year around Sidon that involved elements of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Israelis refrained from assaulting Lebanese Army positions and personnel.  The Israelis have observed, with the rest of the international community, the fiction of a Lebanese government in charge of its foreign and security policy, while acknowledging the reality of total Syrian control of the Lebanese decision making apparatus in this regard. 

Exposing the Fiction in the Lebanese Government. 

Israeli adoption of UN 425 is seen as such a threat to the status quo because it exposes the fiction of this Lebanese government.  The international commitments to maintain security on the Lebanese side of the armistice line and prevent cross border raids, contained in the 1949 Armistice, predate the achievement of Syrian hegemony over Lebanese governmental decision-making.  These commitments are brought back into play by Israeli adoption of 425.  Israeli compliance with 425 reestablishes the obligations of the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, which run counter to Syrian national interests.  The disconnect between the appearance of an independent Lebanese government and the underlying reality of this government as a corruption prone Syrian colonial regime is exposed.  This disconnect between appearance and underlying reality in the Lebanese government will be resolved by this Israeli action. 

Should the Lebanese government renege on this international commitment, its true nature could no longer be ignored by the international community.  No sovereign state could ever contemplate refusing to accept the return of territory, which has been occupied by a neighboring state, and still call itself an independent sovereign state.  Hariri is nevertheless traveling this path by his mouthing the Syrian line of rejecting, out of hand, the Israeli offer to comply with 425 and withdraw from southern Lebanon. 

However, he can not travel this path to its end.  At stake for Hariri, at the end of the day,  is the credibility of his government, not just in security and defense matters, but, more important to him, regarding economic policy.  Hariri's ambitious budgetary policies has caused government finances to float on a sea of treasure issues which have been sold on European bond markets at interest rates which are sensitive to issues such as the credibility of the state that issued them and supposedly stand behind them.  The deficit of the Lebanese government is staggering. It constituted 59% of government expenditures in 1997 and 31.37% thus far in 1998.  The Government can remain solvent so long as its next treasury issue can be successfully sold on the European bond markets.  Standard & Poor, in February 1998, changed its rating outlook from "stable" to "negative" due to unchecked growth of public debt.  Lebanese debt issues currently carry a "B" Standard & Poor rating. 

Recently President Elias Hrawi explained that Lebanon had to reject the Israeli overture because, he explained, Lebanon had to be the last Arab state to make peace with Israel.  According to Hrawi, because Lebanon's economic well being is tied directly to its ability to deal with the Arab states, Lebanon would lose Arab economic support if it were to make peace with Israel before her stronger Arab brethren did.  This argument is illogical at best. Egypt and Jordan made peace and experienced economic boons as Western money flowed in. Prior to the Netanyahu freezing of progress on the Palestinian negotiation track, all of the member states of the Arab League, save Syria, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon, were openly engaging in commerce with Israel and with each other.  The view expressed by Hrawi is not reflective of reality, which is that Lebanon imports much more than it exports to the Arab states, especially  Syria. 

What is real, however, are international commitments made by sovereign states.  Lebanon can no longer play the dual game of passing itself off as having  legitimate government for purposes of issuing treasury notes, but not for the purpose of complying with obligations such as the 1949 Armistice Accord as well as simple obligations in peace or war under international law. Lebanon either has a government and is an independent state or it is not.   Hariri's personal commitment in Lebanese reconstruction and the credibility of the government he leads can be compelling factors driving him to observe his government's treaty commitments.  

By Demanding Compliance with Existing Agreements, Rather Than Negotiate New Ones, Syria's Veto is Overridden.  There is enough international support for Lebanon as an independent state that its government will be compelled to keep the commitments made in 1949 to Israel and to the United Nations, Syrian intimidation and exhortations to the contrary.  

The requirements of international law and observance of commitments between sovereign states overcomes the naked Syrian veto of the Israeli proposal.  Syria and its retainers in the Lebanese Government can resist an Israeli demand for new negotiations.  After all, there is no diplomatic recognition between the two states and the only context in which the two parties currently engage in diplomatic intercourse is through the Madrid Conference Peace Talks.  Lebanon has refused to enter separate negotiations with Israel in this context due to the Syrian diktat, and everyone is understanding about Lebanon's limitations in this regard.  This is why Syria has defined the issue in this way.   

However, by redefining the Israeli proposal as returning from the shelf previously agreed upon security agreements that had lapsed into non-observance  due to the disintegration of the Lebanese Government, the Syrian case is blunted.  Rather than focusing on negotiating new agreements, the focus should be upon observing and enforcing existing agreements.   The Accord and the consequences of failing to observe its terms provides sufficient "cover" for the Lebanese government to proceed with exerting its authority over the south and negotiating with the UN for the return of that territory to its sovereignty authority, so as to slip the noose of Syrian objections.  

Thus, SCR 425 and its progeny, as well as the April 1996 Monitoring Group established following the latest large scale Israeli incursion, Operation Grapes of Wrath, have all been adopted to address the security issue on the Israeli-Lebanese frontier in the wake of the disintegration of the Lebanese government. That government now presents itself to the international community as reconstructed and legitimate. 

Israel, if it is serious, should and need not couch its proposed compliance in terms of seeking unusual security guarantees through new negotiations with Lebanon, thus opening the door to Syrian objections.  Rather, Israel need only seek assurances, through the UN, that Lebanon will keep past commitments  and  observe the established rules of international law with Israel reciprocating. These are the commitments and operating assumptions of international order out of which SCR 425 arose and into which it shall dissolve. This does not require new negotiations with Lebanon; it does not require a separate peace with Lebanon, nor even that Lebanon extend to Israel diplomatic recognition.   

Israel has actually put to the test the assertions of Prime Minister Hariri that he leads a government of a sovereign state.  This is what is placed at issue by the action of the Israeli proposal to comply with UN Resolution 425.     

Conclusion.

As long as Prime Minister Netanyahu is in office, any progress on the Palestinian Track will be tortured at best.  As seen most recently at the London Conference and the consequences of that conference, there is no support within the Israeli cabinet for a 13% interim withdrawal from West Bank territories.  Within the Knesseth, there are threats to topple the Netanyahu government if he concedes as little as 9% additional territory.  The emotional ties within the Israeli Likud for the West Bank as the "Land of Israel" is too strong for the Netanyahu government to breach.  The United States, for its part, has unambiguously indicated that agreement on the 13% plan is the threshold that must be crossed before progress can be made on the Olso Accord commitments.           

By staking the fate of this 8 year old process on progress along the Palestinian Track while the Syrian and Lebanese remain dormant, the United States has risked missing this opportunity for peace.  The Syrian Track has more possibilities.  However, as long as Syria has available to it the leverage provided by Hezbollah operations in Lebanon, that negotiation is likewise an uphill struggle.   

Lebanon remains the key.  By adopting SCR 425, Israel has made a beginning.  Israel should take the next step of recognizing the diplomatic context of 425 and the security agreements that are part and parcel of 425.  Israel, if it is serious about withdrawal from Lebanon and ending Hezbollah operations from Lebanese territory, need only call back into play existing agreements, updated through negotiations with the UN. 

The onus is on Israel in the wake of the collapse of the London Conference and the cancellation of the Washington summit for the current breakdown of the peace talks.  They can help themselves in the court of world opinion and make a showing of good faith that they are willing to cede occupied territory when security concerns have been met.  Lebanon is a much better forum for this show of good faith and the restoration of trust that this process so desperately needs if it is to proceed.  

Israel can thus show itself to the international community as complying with UN resolutions; leaving occupied territory; and lowering the level of tension and animosity that currently exists against it among the Arab States.  Israel can also remove the main leverage that Syria has used to freeze negotiations.  The benefits are great, the costs are low.  It should be done. 

Prepared by the Policy Advisory Board of the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans Copyright (c) 1998, Joseph L. Boohaker, Birmingham, AL Chairman, Ziad Nassar, Atlanta Georgia, Dr. Ghassan Raad, Washington D.C., Toufic Baaklini, Beirut Lebanon, Dr. Muhamad Mugraby, Beirut, Lebanon, Toufic Nassif, Houston, TX President, ex officio member.