A THIRD WAY TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

With this most recent pause in the peace process, there is an opportunity to gain some prospective on the likelihood of success that the current negotiating strategy may yield. Israel has a pressing immediate need to end the war in south Lebanon and to secure its border with Lebanon. Israel has pledged to withdraw by July 7, 2000 with or without an agreement that would secure the border.

I. Current Linkage – Peace with Syria for Security in Lebanon: A Probable Dead End.

To date, Israel has seen Hafez Assad as the only party capable of delivering peace on the Lebanese border. Israel has thus concentrated its negotiating efforts on meeting conditions for peace set by Assad as the price for winning Assad’s agreement to deliver peace on the Lebanese border. This action has been based on several assumptions:

· That Syria controls the military capability of Hezbollah through its control of the flow of arms to Hezbollah from Iran;

· That Syria controls the political decision making apparatus of the Lebanese government which prevents the Lebanese government from acting against Hezbollah independent of a Syrian political decision to do so;

· That Hezbollah is a manifestation of the Syrian-Iranian regional alliance; and,

· That Hezbollah is used by Syria as a means of achieving leverage in its negotiations with Israel for return of the Golan Heights.

Accordingly, Israel, in order to stop the bleeding that has been inflicted on it in Lebanon by Hezbollah, has turned to Assad as the person that can deliver security on its border with Lebanon. Assad has set his price for rendering this service to Israel. That price has been publicly stated to be a return of the Golan Heights, defined as being to the pre-June 6, 1967 demarcation lines. That border runs west from Syria all the way to the littoral line of the Lake Tiberias and meanders back and forth across the upper Jordan River. This is the principle water supply line for major Israeli population centers in the northern and central part of the country.

According to published reports, citing no less an authority than Patrick Seale, Assad is in no position to accept less than a complete return of the Golan to the pre-1967 border. And this is his precondition to negotiating the other details of a treaty that would establish, not normalized relations between the two states, but “friendly relations”.

Israel, on the other hand, can only enter into a treaty with Syria that will pass a national referendum in order to be ratified. There is a major electoral bloc in Israel that passionately opposes any such concession of territory on the Golan to Assad. Not only would state security be jeopardized, but such a concession would also put the country’s water supplies at risk.

In short, the price set by Assad for peace in Lebanon may prove too high for the Israelis to pay. The Syrian peace feeler set out in December 1999 appears to be only that. Assad was curious enough about Prime Minister Barak’s intentions to make peace that he surfaced, sent his Foreign Minister to Washington to feel out the Israeli side to determine what they were willing to give. This information secured, Assad went back underground to apply more pressure on Israel through Hezbollah in an attempt to soften the Israeli position.

The talks set to resume in late March 2000 remain premised upon an Israeli commitment to return the entire Golan to Syrian sovereignty. Any breakthrough on the Syrian track to an agreement is conditioned upon Barak’s ability to not only concede the entire Golan, but to win approval in the Israeli Parliament and a majority in a popular vote conducted in Israel. However the Likud introduced and passed a bill in the Knesseth that made such a referendum on the Golan that much more difficult to conclude as it requires a majority of all Israeli voters, not of the actual voters. This will include all Israelis eligible to vote both resident and non-resident.

The option of unilateral withdrawal without a security agreement in order to end the bloodshed in Lebanon is not a sound strategic choice for Israel. Should Israel unilaterally withdraw on July 7, which is currently seen as the only other option to withdrawal, absent a treaty with Assad, Hezbollah will claim a huge victory in Lebanon, on the scale of the Viet Cong victory in April 1975 over the United States, and will be demanding political power as a result. This can not be a strategic goal for Israel, but it is surely a result that Israel will reap with a unilateral withdrawal.

As recent events show, Israeli targeting of Lebanese infrastructure installations as a means of retaliation against Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in Lebanon has become diplomatically unacceptable. Not only the U.S., but Egypt as well as many others in the region disapproved of such tactics. Thus, when Israel does withdraw in July, they can expect Hezbollah to attack their rear with a relative degree of impunity as Israel will not have the means available to strike back in any meaningful way. This will only underline the Hezbollah military “triumph” over the Israeli enemy. Hezbollah is already taking credit as being the only Arab force to ever militarily defeat Israel and recover occupied land.

Sheikh Nasrallah has already declared in the press his political agenda to be pursued in the wake of any such withdrawal. With 7 seats in the Lebanese parliament and control of a bloc of 50 seats, there is no Lebanese party that currently has more power in the Parliament than Hezbollah. They have an agenda of assisting the Palestinian refugees, anticipated to be stranded in Lebanon by the peace process, to continue the fight of “resistance” against Israel from Lebanon. Iran is already preparing to substitute for Lebanese Shi’ites, Palestinian refugees to carry on the fight against Israel from Lebanon. According to London’s Sunday Telegraph (Feb. 14, 2000) “experienced Iranian Revolutionary Guards are helping train Palestinian recruits at camps in the Bekaa Valley, while some recruits have been sent to Iran for specialist training.” This same newspaper reported that Hezbollah attacks on Israeli positions in southern Lebanon during the period of February 6-12, 2000 were executed with American made TOW missiles, shipped from Iran to Lebanon from stores of TOW missiles that were part of the arms for hostages “Irangate” incident of the mid-1980’s.

III. Unlink Settlement of the Golan from Security in Lebanon - Time to Stop Dancing to Assad’s Tune.

It is time to unlink the issue of Israeli security on its Lebanese border from a resolution with Syria on the Golan. This is Assad’s game and it works to no one’s interest but his own. Since the signing of the Kuenetra Accord in 1974, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Assad has sought to create the conditions that we now find in south Lebanon as a substitute means of maintaining low intensity military pressure on Israel to reverse the outcome of that war and the 1967 War with regard to his loss of Syrian territory. It is time to recognize that conditions in Lebanon since 1974 reflect Assad’s manipulation of this neighboring state into a position of subservience so as to allow Assad to pursue his interests against Israel through the illegitimate means of aggression and coercion committed against a neighboring sovereign state.

The Assad bargain of return of all of the Golan in exchange for a secure Lebanese border, makes no sense in terms of Israeli strategic national defense interests. In Lebanon, Israel has a slowly bleeding sore that could never reach the dimensions of posing a threat to Israeli national security. It is a nuisance, one with which the Israeli people have lost patience. In the Golan, the Israelis have a high priority national security interest. It is involved with issues of maintaining strategic territorial depth, listening posts, secure water resources, and all along the border of a large well armed and potentially unstable unfriendly neighbor. Why trade off a strategic defense interest in order to staunch a bloody nose? While this logic works for Assad, it can not work for Israel. Yet, Barak has allowed himself and Israel to become cornered by Assad’s chess moves carried out over the past 25 years to this culmination point.

Israeli calculations with regard to Hezbollah has ignored the Lebanese people at the same time as it has ignored the Lebanese government, considering both as non-entities. This is a critical error. The Lebanese Government may be captive to Syrian national interests in Lebanon, but the people of Lebanon are not. Assuming that Barak and Assad are able to strike a treaty that has as its basis a return of the Golan as the consideration for the Syrian Army to guarantee a secure Lebanese border, even using the instrumentality of the Lebanese Army, this will not produce peace for Israel on its border with Lebanon. There exist many groups from Lebanon who have made themselves known to NALA which intend to carry on guerilla warfare against Syrian troops in Lebanon should a peace be concluded that leaves Lebanon as a Syrian garrisoned state.

Recent demonstrations against the U.S. embassy by AUB students indicates the degree of frustration building within Lebanon against a peace process that would leave the country under foreign occupation, saddled with 350,000 Palestinian refugees, 10% of the resident Lebanese population, and subject to air attacks from Israel. The Palestinians themselves are undergoing training currently in camps located in the Bekaa to continue cross border fighting with the Israel with the active political and logistic support of Hezbollah and possibly other disillusioned Lebanese.

Syria, having made peace with Israel will lose all influence with such rejectionist groups. As Sheikh Naim Kassim of Hezbollah told members of the NALA policy team in July 1998, the marriage between Hezbollah and Syria is one of convenience, not of love and affection. He stated that Hezbollah was aware that Syria was using their “resistance” and that in return, Hezbollah was using Syria. As long as they could both use each other, the marriage would continue. When Hezbollah is no longer of any use to Syria, and this will happen if Syria enters a peace treaty with Israel, the marriage will be over and we could see Hezbollah attacks against Syrian forces in Lebanon.

Resolution of the Palestinian Refugee Issue For Peace on the Lebanese Border.

As an alternative strategy to resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah war in southern Lebanon, a new strategic linkage should be created; a new quid pro quo. In Lebanon today, there is universal cross confessional support on two issues, they are:

1. Support for the Hezbollah resistance effort, not because it is legitimate, or Islamic, or brave or just, but because to the Lebanese it is the last bit of leverage with which they have to force Israel and the United States to address the second issue for which there is universal support, that being;

2. Resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue in Lebanon. This is the most critical issue to the Lebanese vis a vis the Israelis.

The Lebanese will continue to support the Hezbollah resistance effort as long as the Palestinian refugee issue remains unaddressed by Israel. To the Lebanese people, this is the critical linkage between the issues.

There is also a confluence here between Lebanese national interests and strategic American interests, regarding the Palestinian refugees, that has gone, thus far, unaddressed. Strategic U.S. interests deal with defense of the United States and defense of our strategic allies. Israel is a strategic American ally. It makes no sense, in terms of strategic Israeli defense interests, to conclude a comprehensive regional peace between Israel and her neighbors that leaves stranded, in an adjoining state, 350,000 homeless impoverished refugees who have no stake in the peace that was hammered out, other than to break it. This is especially true in light of current information which indicates a willingness on the part of Iran, acting through a politically enhanced Hezbollah, to exploit this situation to their benefit in Lebanon.

To date, Israel has not recognized any interest in addressing this problem, assuming that dealing with the problem will mean allowing these refugees to return to Israel and the West Bank thus seriously upsetting the demographics of Israel. The land can only support as many souls as water resources will allow and water resources in Israel are sparse. For many reasons, Israel would rather leave the Palestinians where they are. Current negotiating strategy calls for the entire topic to be relegated as an issue to be addressed in the “Final Status Talks” on the Palestinian track of negotiations. However, it is widely believed that more important issues will take priority such as territorial concessions, the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian statehood. The fate of the refugees will be unimportant indeed.

This strategy must be rethought and reversed. It is by addressing the Palestinian refugee issue in Lebanon that the entire Peace process can open up and sprint down the stretch to a comprehensive settlement.

It is this issue which is the true quid pro quo for resolution of the Lebanon War. With the limited time now available to the Clinton Administration to conclude treaties in this process, the opportunity cost associated with not looking at more fruitful strategies toward achieving a breakthrough must be evaluated.

Barak must get out of the corner into which Assad has painted him if his government is to survive, much less lead Israel into peace treaties with the neighbors. This is accomplished by undoing Assad’s handiwork in Lebanon. It is only by Assad’s ability to hold Lebanon in lockstep with his overall strategy that he has been able to dictate the terms of the negotiation. In order to soften Assad’s position on the Golan so that he will relent and agree to something that will pass an Israeli referendum, Lebanon must first be pried from his hand.

1. Address relocation of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon now. These refugees are not under the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Government, nor of the Israeli government, but the UN High Commissioner on Refugees. The United States should solicit new host states in which these families can move and relocate eventually obtaining citizenship in the host state. There would be costs involved in which funds made available for implementation of the peace accords could be expended as aid to both the states that agree to host a share of the refugee population and to the families themselves to assist with relocation. In conjunction with this, the parties could agree:

a. As a symbolic gesture that a nominal group of refugees be returned to the West Bank and Gaza, as well as to Israel proper.

c. That the President, in order to underline US commitment and concern for this Lebanese issue, and its role in resolving it, announce this program with Lebanese leaders present at the White House, including Mr. Berri, Mr. Hoss, Mr. Lahoud, Mr. Junblatt, Cardinal Sfeir, and the Sunni Mufti for Lebanon, or some other such leadership that can bring with them popular support within Lebanon from all confessional groups for this effort and then call for implementation of UNRES 425.

2. Withdrawal under UN Auspices. Israel then can cast its withdrawal in terms of compliance with the UN Resolution. The putative objections voiced by the Lebanese government would be muted. The Lebanese people would broadly support a withdrawal that has been thus linked to resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue. Pursuant thereto:

a. UNIFIL would serve as the transitory force to which Israelwould turn over security positions as its forces depart for new lines established at the international border.

b. UNIFIL will serve as a covering force to cover the Israeli pullout from Hezbollah fire.

c. UNIFIL, following the Israeli withdrawal would then collect arms from Hezbollah.

d. UNIFIL would then end its transitory duties and turn its positions over to the Lebanese Army and internal security forces.

By this scenario of events, the following tactical and strategic benefits flow to aid successful completion of the peace process:

A. Assad will immediately understand the purpose of moves taken to resettle the refugees from Lebanon and will understand that this truly is the end of the Hezbollah card. There could be an immediate softening of his position on the Syrian track, especially now that the Clinton Administration is winding down.

B. A very thorny issue is removed from the table of the Final Status Talks on the Palestinian track.

C. The support within Lebanon for the Hezbollah military effort willevaporate, as the basis for that support will have been resolved.

D. Hezbollah, which has been preparing to transition into a political force in Lebanon will proceed on that course, realizing that the military effort is over with nothing further to be gained by pursuing it. Hezbollah itself has as its strategic objective in Lebanon, not to use it as a base from which to permanently wage war on Israel, but to integrate itself into the Lebanese political landscape. This military effort is being used as a justification for the acquisition and exercise of political power within Lebanon.

E. The Lebanese Army with the full support of the Lebanese people, which the President can secure through a call of their leadership to the White House, will perform security duty on Israel’s border, thus ending the last active front in the Arab Israeli Wars.

F. Any regional power with intentions of future use of Lebanon as a staging ground from which to “liberate” Palestine will have been denied the large pool of impoverished homeless, stateless men from which to recruit new guerilla armies to fight their wars against Israel.

G. Syria will have lost, totally, its leverage in its negotiations with Israel freeing Israel to negotiate a treaty with Syria that can pass a national referendum. Syria is already a party to a disengagement accord with Israel dating to 1974. The cold peace that Syria offers already exists. Normal relations with Syria and Lebanon can await the passing of Assad from power.

Israel thus has a third option to securing peace on its Lebanese border that is not reliant upon the tender mercies of Hafez al Assad. There is a way out of Lebanon beside untenable concessions of territory on the Golan or unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. It is through meeting the conditions demanded by the Lebanese people for the withdrawal of their support for the Hezbollah military effort being made in southern Lebanon that this war will not only end, but real peace can be given a chance to succeed.

This new strategy does not link compromise of a vital strategic interest in which Israel loses its territorial strategic advantages in the Golan in order to obtain relief from its bloody nose in Lebanon. Rather, this strategy allows Israel a way to not only end its border war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, but to do so by serving another vital strategic interest of resolving the refugee issue. It serves Israeli national interests not to have a neighboring state serving as host to 350,000 displaced persons ready willing and able to serve as the next guerilla army to wage war on Israel using the same tactics successfully employed by Hezbollah.

This new strategy of linking resolution of the Hezbollah – Israeli War to resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue in Lebanon does not require any political decision making on the part of Lebanese political authorities. The Lebanese government, in areas that deal with the peace process, must be considered for all intent and purposes as one in the same with the Syrian government. This is the Assad construct.

Decisions regarding the relocation of refugee populations and deployment of transitional forces already reside with international bodies acting under the authority of the United Nations. The United States need only employ the tools that already exist.

This is a doable program. The Administration must decide, with the limited amount of time left in the President’s term, whether it will spend that time further chasing down a strategy that has proven illogical in terms of strategic Israeli national security interests, or whether it will expend this time opening a new front that can at least soften the hardened positions of those who resist peace if for no other reason than out of fear of it.

Prepared and distributed by the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans, Policy Committee: Joseph L. Boohaker, Birmingham AL Chm., Ziad Nassar, Atlanta GA, Toufic Baaklini, Washington, D.C. Copyright © March, 2000

Establishment of New Linkage to End the War in South Lebanon