HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

April 6, 2001

INTRODUCTION

My name is Toufic Baaklini. I am the Chairman of the Government Affairs Committee of the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans (NALA). NALA is a tax exempt charitable organization whose primary mission in the United States is to inform and educate our fellow citizens regarding issues of Lebanese/American interests, and to bring a heightened sense of awareness to our fellow Lebanese Americans of Lebanon's rich cultural heritage, which is seriously threatened by a deepening foreign occupation. NALA wishes to thank the Committee for honoring its request to submit this Testimony to the Subcommittee.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Regionally

Since the Subcommittee last conducted public hearings on the issue of appropriations for Lebanon, last March, the country and the region have witnessed a tidal change. Over the course of the past twelve months, the South Lebanon Army disintegrated as a military force resulting in the orderly withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Under the authority of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) the provisions of UNRES 425 were carried out by the IDF. The international boundary between Israel and Lebanon was delineated and the Israeli forces redeployed to the Israeli side of the international border.

Though this redeployment took place under the auspices of the United Nations, the Hezbollah militia did not disband, nor did the legitimate forces of the Lebanese Government deploy to the international frontier in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. Rather, Hezbollah remained in the field claiming that the withdrawal was not complete due to the continued presence of the IDF in the Shebaa Farms district on the slopes of Mount Hermon. Despite the region’s designation on international maps as being Syrian national territory, Hezbollah continued to claim the territory as Lebanese, with the Lebanese Government and the Syrian Government in accord. Though Israel challenged Syria to formally amend internationally maintained demarcation maps which indicate that the Shebaa Farms is part of Syrian national territory, Syria declined.

In neighboring Syria, the 30 year regime of Hafez al Assad came to an end on June 10, 2000 with the senior Assad’s death. He was succeeded by his son, Bashar Assad. Despite the younger Assad’s initial statements indicating a desire to modernize Syrian society, institutions and economy, the Baath Party remains in firm control of the Syrian state.

Israel likewise witnessed a change in regimes with the election of Arial Sharon to the office of Prime Minister on February 6, 2001. The passing from the scene of Ehud Barak also meant the end of any chance for progress toward peace treaties between Israel and any of her neighbors who remain outside of the peace regime.

In March 2000, Barak’s government made the most generous offer to date with the regime of Hafez al Assad for peace with Syria. The proposal committed Israel to end its 23 year occupation of the Golan Heights, retaining only an access road around Lake Tiberius. Syria rejected the offer balking at the Israeli demand for the 10 foot wide access road around the north east shoreline of the interior body of water. With this rejections, the Syrian track of the Peace Talks failed.

On September 13, 2000, the deadline for conclusion of the Final Status Talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, mandated by the 1993 Oslo Accord was not met, triggering a new intefada, which remains ongoing. Despite efforts by the Clinton Administration to press forward on the Palestinian Track, the effort failed when the Israeli offer of statehood, with a capital in East Jerusalem, was rejected by Arafat’s Palestinian Authority.

With the inauguration of the Bush Administration on January 20, 2001, the formal policy of the United States toward the Peace Talks transformed the American role, from “insisting to assisting”. Secretary Powell declared that all offers which had been rejected were formally withdrawn, as far as the United States was concerned and the Peace Process declared dead.

Former Special Coordinator of the Middle East Peace Process, Ambassador Dennis Ross is on record as having said that solving the Israeli – Palestinian conflict will not happen in the near term, but “managing the conflict and creating the basis for progress are possible”. (US&WR 3/5/01) Regarding the Syrian track, Ambassador Ross wrote:

“While a permanent solution between the Israelis and Syrians may be more immediately achievable, the risk of a conventional war is also greater between them. Hezbollah provocations against Israeli forces in the Shebaa Farms area – which Israel took from Syria in the1967 War but Hezbollah claims as Lebanese – could produce a rapid cycle of escalation between Israel and Syria. Our Arab friends and President Assad will need to hear from the secretary that Hezbollah is playing with fire, and Syria is likely to be burned unless it acts to prevent Hezbollah from triggering a war.”

Middle East regional press sources have also reported that Iran has in the past 12 months delivered 120 km range missiles to Hezbollah and that the missiles are stored at sites in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Reportedly, the shipment and storage of the missiles were known to former Prime Minister Barak and former President Clinton, who advised the Prime Minister not to take military action at the time for the sake of delicate peace talks that were then ongoing. Sharon has since taken up the subject of the missiles and his proposal for a military strike against them with President Bush who agreed that the missiles should be militarily taken out by Israel. (An Nahar 3/26/01).

To summarize, regionally, there has been a complete turn over all governments relevant to Lebanon: From Clinton to Bush in the United States; from Barak to Sharon in Israel; and from Hafaz Assad to Bashar Assad in Syria. The effect of this turn over of leadership has been to move the region from an historic peace, to retrenchment back to a period of low intensity military confrontation. American Policy has changed from being pro-active toward creating a peace regime for Lebanon, Israel and her neighbors, to reactionary in maintaining stability of the status quo until some time in the unforeseeable future when and if peace talks resume.

Internal Lebanese Political Developments

Internally, Lebanon conducted Parliamentary elections during August and September 2000. According to the United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices – 2000 on Lebanon, “the elections were flawed and the outcome was heavily influenced by the Syrian Government. The State Department Report also stated the following:

“Parliamentary elections in August and September were flawed. The Syrian Government heavily influenced the electoral law governing the process and also pre-approved all of the candidates on alliance slates who ultimately won seats in the Cabinet. . . . .

“In 1989, the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi Arabia, to end the country’s civil war. According to the Taif Accord, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to determine the redeployment of Syrian troops from their position in Lebanon’s coastal population areas to specified areas of the Biqa Valley, with full withdrawal contingent upon subsequent agreement by both Governments. The Syrian Government has not carried out this partial redeployment, and strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and decision-makers makes officials unwilling to press for a complete withdrawal. Since the Taif Accord was signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The Government’s relationship with Syria does not reflect the will of most of the country’s citizens.”

The State Department Report reflected a growing movement within Lebanon for independence from Syrian tutelage. Electoral alliances began to emerge between Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party and Former President Amine Gemayel’s Kataeb Party which resulted in the election of Jumblatt’s list in the Chouf District and the election of Gemayel’s son, Pierre and others in the Metn District.

The movement has crystallized behind the leadership of Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Butrous Sfeir and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. There has emerged an open questioning of the need for the continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon in light of the end of the Israeli presence from southern Lebanon in May of 2000.

Cardinal Sfeir traveled to the United States and Canada in March 2001 advocating this position, specifically echoing the position taken in the U.S. State Department Country Report on Lebanon regarding the need for an independent decision making authority in the Lebanese Government and the commencement of a Lebanese Syrian dialogue to redeploy the Syrian Army to the Bekaa Valley as required by the 1989 Taif Accord, which the United States sponsored within the Arab League. The Bush Administration refused to meet with or to give support to the efforts of the Patriarch to promote stated U.S. Policy for Lebanon.

Upon the return of the Patriarch to Lebanon, crowds estimated to 400,000 greeted his arrival and signaled support for his calls that U.S. policy be implemented in Lebanon. Syrian sponsored elements within the Lebanese government, as well as Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah have openly opposed the stance taken by Cardinal Sfeir and Walid Jumblatt demanding more independence for the Lebanese state. The Bush Administration, thus, by diplomatically snubbing the Cardinal in his American mission has given aid and comfort to those within Lebanon who oppose the stated policy of the United States toward Lebanon.

Economic Developments.

According to the State Department Country Report on Lebanon for the year 2000, almost all economic indicators point downward. The government’s budget deficit is 46% of expenditures, 9% higher than it was in 1999; per capita GDP stood at $4,700; unemployment at 20% and total public debt at $27 billion, over 140% of GDP. The government set minimum wage, according to the U.S. State Department report is approximately $200.00/month (300,000 Lebanese pounds). The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for the worker and his family.

Syrian workers flood the Lebanese labor markets under inequitable bi-lateral accords reached between Syria and its sponsored government in Lebanon further exacerbating the employment situation by driving down wages. According to the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) there are approximately 200,000 resident Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, though there are 370,000 registered with the UNRWA who could reside in Lebanon awaiting a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This economic crisis is resulting in emigration rates of approximately 35,000 persons from Lebanon to countries in the West. These émigrés are the remnant of what was once Lebanon’s thriving economic middle classes of artisans and professionals who find it economically impossible to sustain themselves and their families any longer in Lebanon. This emigration is resulting in a dramatic shift in Lebanon’s demographic make up. Lebanon which was once a moderate Arab Republic with one of the highest literacy rates in the region and an economy that offered its citizens economic mobility, is now an economy with a very few wealthy in the upper economic classes, a broad gap where once existed the middle class and then the lower economic classes with all opportunity for upward mobility all but erased. Literacy rates once in the mid-90 percentiles now are the low 60 percentiles.

With the population becoming poorer and more illiterate, ready recruits are found for militias whose presence creates political and societal instability. These trends have come to exist at a time when U.S. policy for the states that border Israel is to create and establish stability and peace on Israel’s borders.

The root cause of these negative trends is Syrian domination of political decision making within the Lebanese government. In order to reverse these trends, U.S. policy mirrored in the Congress’ appropriations for aid to Lebanon must address this core problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AID

Based on the above analysis, the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans (NALA) strongly recommends to this Committee that the aid which has been allocated for the Republic of Lebanon, under the previous 5 year plan by which $12 million has been appropriated annually, is to tie this aid, which is disbursed primarily through Non-Government Organizations (NGO’s) by the USAID be conditioned upon the Lebanese Government inviting international observers to oversee and report upon the Parliamentary elections scheduled for August 2004. NALA also recommends to the Committee that in its Budget Resolution, the United States commit itself to cooperation with other states, particularly in the EU to which Lebanon issues its government debt, that any further debt issues not be purchased unless and until the Lebanese government commits to allowing international observers to monitor its elections.

We have seen, in every Parliamentary election since the adoption of the Taif Accord - the 1992, 1996 and now the 2000 elections – the heavy Syrian influence wielded in the selection process. This has been documented by our State Department. It is abundantly clear that a government answerable to neighboring Syria will never voluntarily invite independent election monitors to oversee its elections. It must be compelled and the most efficient way is to tie it as a condition of aid and loans to that government.

France has already begun the process of conditioning aid upon the Lebanese government assuming its duty by dispatching the legal forces of the state to take control of the border region shared with Israel. The Lebanese Prime Minister attempted to carry out this condition but was thwarted by the Syrian regime acting through its agents within the Hezbollah Party in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government cannot fund even the interest on its national debt without exercising a further ability to borrow from the West primarily. It is therefore on this need that the condition should be placed.

By conditioning all financial aid and loan assistance on this measure to make the Lebanese Government an honest one, answerable to her people rather than to her neighbor, Lebanese of an independent stripe will seek and obtain office and assume control of the Lebanese Government. Freed from the demands of her neighbor’s national interests, Lebanon can again be counted upon to assume her duty as an independent sovereign state with regard to economic, political, security, and diplomatic policies.

NALA's recommendation to this Committee is neither anti-Israeli nor anti-Syrian. It is pro-Lebanese. In order to best serve American interests in the region, at this time, of promoting stability between and among Israel and her neighbors until such time as a comprehensive peace can be achieved, the best guarantor is the fostering of democracy in Israel’s neighborhood. History has shown that governments answerable to their people make for the best neighbors. Lebanon seeks with Syria, normalized relations as are appropriate for states which share a common history. With the United States, at this time courting Syria as a frontline state bordering Iraq to assume more responsibility for the sanction regime that the United States wished to impose on Iraq, it is time for Syria to disengage from its role in Lebanon so that it can more fully participate in that more significant American policy objective.

NALA recommends the adoption of its program for Lebanon not only because it will benefit the Lebanese; and not only because by doing so American strategic interests will be preserved; but, because it is the right thing to do.

Thank you.