|
|
|
TESTIMONY OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS SUBMITTED
TO THE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS March 30, 2000INTRODUCTION My name is Toufic Baaklini. I am the Chairman of the Government Affairs Committee of the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans (NALA). NALA is a tax exempt charitable organization whose primary mission in the United States is to inform and educate our fellow citizens regarding issues of Lebanese/American interests, and to bring a heightened sense of awareness to our fellow Lebanese Americans of Lebanon's rich cultural heritage, which is seriously threatened by a deepening foreign occupation. NALA wishes to thank the Committee for honoring its request to submit this Testimony to the Subcommittee. POLITICAL
BACKGROUND Since the Subcommittee last conducted public hearings on the issue of appropriations for Lebanon, last March, the country and the region has witnessed a change in the climate for negotiation and peace with the elections that took place in Israel and other developments which will be discussed herein, are as follows: A. Security
- The Occupation; Events and the status of south Lebanon; Israeli infrastructure
air strikes inside Lebanon. B. Diplomatic
- Developments in the Peace Talks, the growing possibility of a unilateral
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, the growing influence of Hezbollah, and C. Economic - The state of the Lebanese Economy A. SECURITY. · The Syrian Occupation. Over most of its territory, Lebanon remains a state occupied by neighboring Syria. According to the just released State Department Country Report on Lebanon for Human Rights Practices for 1999, Syria continues to maintain a 25,000 man occupation force in Lebanon which does not operate in any coordinated fashion with the command structure of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Syria also maintains a network of military intelligence personnel operating independently in Lebanon and in non conformance with the 1989 Taif Accord and implementing agreements reached in 1991. These forces undermine the authority of the central government according to the State Department report. Human Rights Watch documented in its latest country report the extent of the occupation, reporting specifically on the February 1999 Syrian elections which were also conducted in Lebanon, not at Syrian diplomatic missions, but in some 36 voting booths set up throughout Lebanon. These posts were guarded by personnel of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces and supervised by Syrian intelligence officers. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir protested the derogation to Lebanese sovereignty evidenced by this action. · The Israeli Occupation. In addition to Syrian forces, there are 2,000 members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operating in the self declared Israeli Security Zone in south Lebanon and 1,500 members of their allied militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). · Events and the Status of south Lebanon. In 1999 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) suffered 11 casualties and thus far, in 2000 the death toll has been 6 killed, primarily in one assault that took place in February. Military activity in the south did not take place in a vacuum but throughout 1999 was related to other regional events. The flare ups in March, April and May were seen as related to Israeli elections which were held on May 17, 1999. Prior to American diplomatic missions to the region, such as Secretary Albright’s mission on September 4, there were bombings of civilian targets as well. The primary development of the past year, however, was the continued deterioration of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) as a fighting force. As early as April 4 it was reported that morale was near collapse and on May 27, it was announced that the SLA would withdraw from the Jezzine salient. This withdrawal took place in two phases beginning on June 1. Hezbollah insured that the withdrawal would be a bloody one by planting roadside bombs along the withdrawal route inflicting as much damage and injury as possible. The second phase was made less bloody only through the intervention of the United States which acted through Syria to restrain Hezbollah so that the second phase of the pull out could be carried out in a more orderly way. It was noted by residents of Jezzine that the withdrawal marked the end of any form of Lebanese versus Lebanese fighting in the country. The fight in south Lebanon has been characterized since the withdrawal as a pure resistance effort of Hezbollah fighting Israelis justified by the presence of Israeli troops on Lebanese soil. Following the withdrawal, Jezzine was relatively calm with Lebanese gendarme taking up policing duties in the city. However, Timur Goksel of UNIFIL predicted that this should not be taken as a model for a full withdrawal. He said that there would be no peace along the Israeli border as long as 350,000 Palestinian refugees remained in Lebanon as “contractors” for those who oppose a comprehensive peace. UN and Palestinian sources estimate that the actual number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is approximately 200,000. · Israeli Infrastructure Air Strikes Inside Lebanon. On June 24, 1999 and again on February 8, 2000 the Israeli Air Force executed bombing and missile attacks on Lebanese infrastructure targets consisting of power plants, dams and bridges. The assault in June followed a flare up started when Israel decided to test a new anti tank rocket which killed several Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah responded with rocket attacks into northern Israeli settlements. Outgoing Prime Minister Netanyahu, within only days of the end of his mandate ordered the attack which seriously set back Lebanon’s economic recovery. In
February, Prime Minister Barak ordered a similar attack in response to a
Hezbollah raid that killed 6 soldier of the IDF.
This assault was in violation of the April 1996 Understanding by which
both Israel and Lebanon, nominally, agreed not to target or attack each
other’s civilian populations. The
Hezbollah attack was carried out within the Israeli self declared “Security
Zone” against combatants. Though Netanyahu and his Minister Moshe Arens
declared at the time that Israel would no longer comply with the terms of the
April Understanding, Prime Minister Barak, upon entering office, had reaffirmed
Israel’s commitment to the protocol. This
second attack destroyed installations that were not yet completely repaired from
the June assault. It resulted in
wide spread condemnation of the Israeli action, a rebuke from the United States
and it prompted the first state visit to Lebanon by an Egyptian President in
over 40 years when Hosni Mubarak went to Beirut on February 19, 2000 to express
support for Lebanon and its resistance. This
trip was seen as chilling the already cold peace that exists between Israel and
Egypt. B.
DIPLOMATIC n
Developments in the Peace Talks. Until the election on May 17, 1999 of Ehud Barak
and his assuming office on July 6, 1999, there were no developments in the
regional peace talks. However, with
his election came very positive signs from Damascus that President Assad was
interested in restarting the Syrian track that had been indefinitely suspended
since March 1996. Throughout the Summer of 1999 signs continued to emanate from
Damascus of eagerness to resume talks. The
infrastructure attacks on Lebanon in July were not condemned by Syria, rather
they attributed the attack to Netanyahu as a farewell message to Lebanon.
Hezbollah was refrained from making the usual response of attacking
inside of Israel. On July 20, Syria asked Palestinian rejectionists factions in
Damascus to end the armed struggle against Israel. Then Prime Minister Khaddam reportedly told these
Palestinians that the armed struggle against Israel from Lebanon and Syria is
now over. Assad himself commented
that Barak struck him as a “strong and honest man” who could negotiate
peace. With regard to the Syrian
track, Assad reportedly stated “land is not negotiable, but everything else
is.” Though initial attempts to restart the stalled Palestinian
track failed, a diplomatic mission by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on
September 2, 1999 resulted in the signing of the Sharm el Sheikh agreement on
September 4, implementing the Wye River Accords, and establishing target dates of February 13, 2000 for
completion of the framework for the Final Status accord and September 14, 2000
as the date upon which the formal treaty between Israel and the Palestinians
would be executed. President
Clinton again met with the parties in Oslo Norway on November 4 to resolve
negotiating disputes. The
parties did not meet their February 13, 2000 deadline and talks were suspended,
but restarted on March 6 through the efforts of Special Envoy Dennis Ross. During the week of March 20, as Pope John Paul II was making
his papal visit to the area, the withdrawals scheduled for February 13 took
place. As
progress was being made and attention given to the Palestinian track through the
Summer and Autumn of 1999, Damascus chafed at being ignored especially at a time
when it showed every sign of eagerness to proceed. In
early December, Secretary Albright, on her second diplomatic mission to the
region following the election of Prime Minister Barak, visited Assad in
Damascus, however there was no progress due to the continued Syrian demand for a
total return of the Golan, as was promised by Rabin in 1995.
However, shortly thereafter, it was announced that talks would resume
“where they left off in 1996”. Though
Syria saw this as a diplomatic coup, actually the U.S. told both Israel and
Syria that this meant whatever either wished to interpret it as meaning. Talks
resumed at Shephardstown West Virginia on January 3, 2000.
They adjourned with the intention of the parties to have them resume for
a second round on January 19, 2000, however, due to a Syrian boycott, they have
been postponed indefinitely. A
draft of the proposed treaty was published in Israel showing major Syrian
concessions without any Israeli concessions.
The Syrians were clearly embarrassed by this action as well as the cool
reception that the draft got among the Israelis.
This, plus the fact that the Israelis did not commit to returning all of
the Golan prompted the Syrian boycott of further talks. Despite a Syrian - U.S. summit in Geneva between President
Clinton and Hafez Assad on March 26, 2000, the core issue remains unresolved.
Assad demands the return of the Golan all the way to the water line of
Lake Tiberias but Israel insists on a service road around the circumference of
the Lake that would remain under Israeli sovereignty.
This Israeli position, and Assad’s inability to accept it, has left
this track without progress. The
Lebanese government was caught totally unaware by the agreement to resume the
Syrian Talks in December 1999. They
had no negotiating team at the ready until weeks later.
Then, at the instruction of the Syrian delegation, the Lebanese refused
to participate in any negotiations until first there was substantial progress,
as defined by the Syrians, on the Syrian track. Significantly,
the day after the resumption was announced, December 17, there was a flare up in
southern Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Israeli forces.
Then on the day of the resumption, January 3, 2000 an assault against a
Lebanese Army patrol near the town
of Assoun, was staged by an Islamic Fundamentalist group killing an officer, an
NCO and several others. Also there
was a grenade attack on the Russian Embassy in Beirut and the murder of a Roman
Catholic nun near Beirut. Commentators
noted at the time that Syria was probably behind each incident in an effort to
depict Lebanon as inept and unstable, in need of a continuing Syrian military
presence. It was also noted that
these attacks in Lebanon gave Syria negotiating leverage with Israel. However,
the effort failed as the Lebanese Army acquitted itself well in response to the
Fundamentalist assault by capturing or killing elements of the group near
Dinnieh in north Lebanon. Authorities
also commenced investigations into the other incidents.
n
The Growing Possibility of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from south Lebanon.
Conventional wisdom has held that Israel could not end its Lebanon
campaign without security guarantees for its northern border.
Syria, which controls the flow of arms to Hezbollah supposedly is the
party to issue the guarantee, however, its price for issuance is a treaty in
which Israel return the entire Golan, all the way to the water line of Lake
Tiberias. With
the failure thus far experienced on the Syrian track, the alternative of a
unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon has become more of a possibility.
As early as May 1999 Israeli military commanders in Lebanon reported to
the Israeli cabinet that there was no longer any military reason for maintaining
elements of the IDF north of the international border with Lebanon.
Prime Minister Barak reaffirmed in September 1999 Israel’s resolve to
pull out of Lebanon unilaterally if necessary by July 7, 2000, the one year
anniversary of his taking office.
On March 5, 2000 the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously to withdraw
completely from Lebanon, and as reported in Lebanon on March 7, Barak has
decided that such a withdrawal would be accomplished within the context of UNRES
425 and its implementing resolution, 426. This
is a policy that NALA advocated to the Administration 2 years ago.
There is great uncertainty with regard to the security of the south and
the Israeli border in the aftermath of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal.
Lebanese authorities, seeking to buttress the Syrian position on this
issue, have refused to indicate that they will order elements of the LAF to
secure the border. Lebanese President Lahoud, indeed has indicated the very
opposite when he said that a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon will not
bring peace to their common border until Israel concedes the entire Golan back
to Syria. A Lebanese government
spokesman said that Lebanon can not refrain those fighting for Arab lands and
rights. This was a clear reference
to armed Palestinians from Lebanese refugee camps taking up this fight after
elements of Hezbollah end their military efforts with the evacuation of Israeli
troops from Lebanon. NALA has therefore advocated that, concurrent with this
withdrawal, Israel immediately address the Palestinian refugee issue in Lebanon
in anticipation of this new threat posed to Lebanon. n
The Growing Influence of
Hezbollah.
Should the IDF withdraw unilaterally from
Lebanon, Hezbollah is already declaring itself to be the only Arab force to have
ever defeated Israeli forces. Israeli
commentator, Yoel Marcus, stated in Ha’artez,
“This is one war that we have lost.”
Hezbollah stands to reap a huge political windfall from this pending
Israeli withdrawal, as it is prepared to take sole credit for defeating the
enemy Israel. Already it has 7
seats in the Lebanese Parliament and controls 50 others giving it the largest
voting bloc of that assembly. It
runs 2 radio stations, a popular television station, a network of hospitals,
clinics, pharmacies, schools and martial arts centers, as well as welfare and
rehabilitation centers for war casualties and it pays pensions for relatives of
killed fighters. Since the early
1980’s, Iran has pumped an estimated $2 billion dollars into this effort in
Lebanon.
Their ultimate goal, says Professor Nizar Hamzeh, a Lebanese scholar, is
to capture the Lebanese state, from within, if not from without. Sheik Nasrallah, the leader of the Hezbollah, has said that
after the Israeli withdrawal, the organization will become thoroughly involved
in political activities. Militarily,
he has said that it will lend the Palestinians all the help that it can offer.
London’s
Sunday Telegraph reported on
February 14, 2000 what he meant. Iranian
Revolutionary Guards have appeared in training camps in the Bekaa Valley
conducting intensive military training to Palestinian extremists as well as
giving them weapons training on very sophisticated equipment.
C.
ECONOMIC - The
state of the Lebanese Economy. Against
this effort being made by Iran through Hezbollah to perform governmental
services in Lebanon is the effort being made by the Lebanese government itself.
The government’s plan of
economic restoration, stated in 1998, is
a three step process which includes stabilizing the currency, then stabilizing
the budget and then implementing reforms. To date, the currency has been stabilized at an exchange rate
of 1510-1540 lira/$1.00. The
national debt, in 1999 grew from $18.0 billion to $19.0 billion dollars.
Reflecting the government plan, the 1999 fiscal budget for the government
proposed the following spending priorities:
Debt service, civil service and pensions
83.40%
Public Administration
6.35%
Social Development and Investment Schemes
10.25%
Servicing the national debt represented 43% of all spending for 1998 and
the total debt represented 130 of the GDP.
The government decided to address the deficit problem by raising taxes on
an already cash starved economy, and cutting back on social spending.
The government announced on July 9, 1999 that all Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO’s) operating in Lebanon would have their government
subsidies cut by ½ in the current budget.
5,500 disabled students had benefited from the Social Affairs Ministry
which had picked up 30% of these expenses in the past.
The government’s bond rating and ability to continue to finance its
debt with debt issues is dependent upon its maintaining fiscal restraint and
honoring its ever growing debt burden.
Lebanon is still burdened with the presence of over one
million Syrian workers in Lebanon who are seriously underbidding skilled,
semi-skilled and unskilled work away from Lebanese workers and then remitting
the funds to family in Syria. This
poses a serious drain on the Lebanese economy at a time when it is trying to
re-emerge from years of war and neglect. The
Lebanese government is powerless to protest this drain as it finds itself bound
to Syria as a dominated partner in bilateral economic treaties which condone
this practice that is beneficial to Syria.
In addition there are, according to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon which pose an additional
economic burden on the country.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AID Because
the current Lebanese government can not find it within its power to
accept the return of sovereign Lebanese territory from an occupying force
in deference to the demands and requirements of the Syrian government with
regard to implementation of UN RES425; and
because the Lebanese government can not find it within its power to take action
on behalf of Lebanese workers by restricting the entry of Syrian workers into
Lebanon’s labor markets, this government has not, to date, demonstrated the
type of independence required to entrust it as the facilitating institution of
U.S. aid. Therefore, NALA continues
to recommend to this committee that the Lebanese Government be bypassed as an
instrument for delivering American aid to Lebanon.
Lebanon remains a party to a number of interlocking treaty obligations
with the Syrian government so that the United States could not know whether any
aid entrusted to the Lebanese government would actually be used for its intended
purpose in Lebanon, or would be simply funneled to Damascus. In 1999, Syria remained one of the 7 countries that the United
States designated at “state sponsors of international terrorism”, along with
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Sudan. According to Human Rights Watch, Syria received no U.S. aid
in 1999. Pursuant to trade
sanctions imposed in 1979 and broadened in 1986, both on grounds of Syrian
involvement in terrorism, Syria was denied funding from the USAID, as well as
under a number of other U.S. sponsored programs. During
the past year, these links have been strengthened. In October, Lebanese Prime
Minister Hoss and the Syrian government signed accords following the 4th
Session of the Lebanese Syrian
Joint Coordination Committee that dealt with all aspects of life in both
countries, namely: n
Foreign Policy
and total coordination of policies n
Economic
Relations lowering and elimination of trade tariffs. n
The Lebanese
power grid is on a sharing system with Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. n
Gas & Oil.
Syria to provide gas to Lebanese power stations n
Water.
Sharing of Orontes river water and a joint dam project on the Kabir. n
Agriculture.
Reduction of tariffs n
Movement of
people & products a Visa to one
is a visa to both n
Industry.
A license in one country is a license in both n
Environment n
Vocational
training n
Higher Education n
Media n
Communications
joint fiber optic cables for telephone and internet n
Tourism n
Health n
Business
activity. CURRENT USAID PROJECTS. With
the Grapes of Wrath Israeli
incursion of 1996 and the Friends of Lebanon Conference of that year, the USAID
embarked on a 5 year $60 million aid project for Lebanon (1997-2002) Country
Development Strategy. The focus has
been on the rural areas of the country. The
strategic objective of the USAID spending has been “To restore villages to
economic and social viability by establishing sustainable projects having a long
term impact.” This
objective is achieved through the Rural Community Development Clusters project
which has identified 30 such clusters with a total population of 600,000.
The villages were selected from the Higher Relief Committee Report issued
by the United Nations Development Program which targets these villages based on
their level of poverty.
USAID works with NGO’s to service these communities, namely:
The YMCA
Mercy Corp
The Pontifical Mission
Cooperative Housing Foundation &
Creative Associates International. The types of projects are fourfold:
Basic infrastructure
Income producing activities
Civic participation
Environmental activities. The
NGO is expected to contribute 25% of the cost of the project and the local
population is expected to contribute their labor. As
of the end of April 1999 more than 200 projects were completed, another 100 were
in implementation and another 100 in design.
The school addition at Moqaibleh is one. Completed in 5 months it
increased the student capacity from 350 to 500. The first such project of USAID
done in Akkar. $75,000 for a school in Qobeiyat in Akar to be completed in
September 1999 Mr. James Stephenson
Mission Director for USAID in Lebanon since October 1997 does the inspection and
supervision of the projects. On
June 16, 1999 USAID Lebanon announced a $500,000 assistance project for Jezzine
and other area villages to be identified by locals and carried out by NGO’s. Additional funding will be provided over the period of the
next 3 years. This represented a long term commitment, mainly to de-mine the
area.
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR AID
Despite the political and economic realities in Lebanon today, but
rather, because of them, NALA recommends to the Committee that the United States
Government sustain and expand its aid to Lebanon.
Lebanon is a key to American interests in the Middle East and the Eastern
Mediterranean. A strong American
presence is needed in Lebanon to counter the Iranian/Syrian efforts to subvert
American diplomacy and interests in the region.
The litany of ills which beset Lebanon today are recited herein not as a
rationale for the United States to
abandon Lebanon, but rather to define and measure the challenge that we face to
restore it as a stable moderate Arabic republic. Past efforts by the Administration to encourage the evolution
of a more independent political leadership in Lebanon are beginning to take
root. The effort needs to be
continued and sustained. Lebanon
did not become a vassal state overnight and it will not emerge from its
subservient status over night. NALA
recommends the following areas to be addressed in the Foreign Operations budget
for Lebanon: 1. Security and
assistance to the Lebanese Army. 2 Aid for
Economic Development 3. Humanitarian
Aid 4. American
Supported Lebanese Educational Facilities. 1. Security and assistance
to the Lebanese Army.
Of first priority must be the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
This is a 62,000 standing man force, of which 23,000 are conscripts.
It is equipped with the following: 115 US-made M-48 Main Battle Tanks 212 Soviet made T-54/55 Main Battle Tanks 1,164 US made M113 armored personnel carriers 13 US made 105 mm towed cannons 65 US and French made 155mm cannons Foot soldiers are equipped with M-16 assault rifles and
Soviet made AK 47’s
This is a purely defensive force. It
works in conjunction with Internal Security Forces as needed such as its action
in Dinnieh earlier this year. In
the event of an Israeli withdrawal under any of the various programs forwarded
from several quarters as a means for implementation of UN RES425, the LAF will
be called upon to perform security duty in southern Lebanon.
Currently the LAF participates in the Excess Defense Article (EDA)
program for the transfer of surplus U.S. military equipment for nominal prices.
For example, in 1997, the LAF took a shipment of 3000 surplus U.S. Army
Jeeps at a cost of $100 per vehicle. The shipments are from non-lethal U.S.
military surplus stocks. This
program needs to be expanded.
The LAF also participates in the International Military Education &
Training (IMET) program for officer training. The Army in Lebanon remains as the
most respected national institution among the Lebanese people. Under this
section of the budget proposal for FY 2001, the Administration is requesting,
for countries of the Near East, $6.030 million dollars, an increase of $380,000
over the FY 2000 estimate. This
proposal includes a $25,000 increase for Lebanon from $550,000 to $575,000.
The officers of the Lebanese Armed Forces have been a traditional
component beneficiary of that program over the years and NALA strongly
recommends that its participation continue and expand.
Lebanon participates currently in this program through the Mobile
Training Teams (MTT) program whereby Lebanon, rather than send its officers to
the United States, pays the U.S. government to send its officers to Lebanon for
training of Lebanese personnel. NALA
requests that in order to enhance this program that the United States allocate
funds for these American teams to travel to Lebanon for training of the LAF
officers. By supplementation of the
expenditures currently made by the Lebanese government on this program, it can
be expanded.
The United States already has a substantial investment in this force.
It is a very professional force. Through
officer participation in the IMET program, its upper echelons are schooled in
Western ideology of respect for civilian authority and democratic processes.
If and when Lebanese independence re-emerges, a strong national army will be a requisite.
It is an investment in the future.
If the United States does not provide this officer training, these
officers will receive their training in Syria.
This process has already begun. To
the extent that it persists, then this vital institution to the re-emergence of
Lebanese democracy will have been infected with an ideology that is alien
to the concept of civilian control of the military.
In light of political developments outlined above and the increasing
probability that the LAF will be called upon to assume a security role in
southern Lebanon in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal, the small investment in
the training of this force clearly deserves at least as great an increase as
Morocco has been designated to receive in the Administration Budget Request.
2.
Aid for Economic Development. The U.S. to
date has allocated $12 million to U.S.
AID Lebanon projects, some of which were referenced above.
This amount was fixed in 1997 for 5 years, to expire in FY 2002.
These projects have two objectives, namely, the promotion of economic
opportunity and the promotion of democracy, with a special emphasis on the
environment.
In FY 2000, the Congress appropriated $15 million from the Economic
Support Fund for Lebanon. $4
million of that appropriation was earmarked for scholarships and other direct
assistance to American sponsored educational institutions in Lebanon.
It was necessary in order to continue the USAID’s very successful Rural
Community Development Clusters Program and provide needed assistance to American
educational institutions. As the
funds were needed last year they are again needed this year.
Furthermore,
USAID Lebanon announced, as reported in the Daily Star (Lebanon) on June 16,
1999, a $500,000 assistance project for Jezzine and other area villages with
additional funding to be provided over the period of the next 3 years. This represented a long term commitment, mainly to de-mine
the area. For these two reasons,
appropriations from this account should not only remain at last year’s level,
but in order to meet the commitment made last June following the evacuation of
Jezzine by Israeli allied forces to de-mine the area, the appropriation must be
increased over FY 2000 levels by $500,000.
3.
Humanitarian Aid. NALA
requests that the Congress give serious consideration to address the growing
chasm between rich and poor in Lebanon which is going unaddressed by the
Lebanese government. Private
and Voluntary Organizations (PVO’s) which qualify under the provisions of
Title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1985 [Public Law 98-473] are on the ground and operational in Lebanon performing
excellent work among Lebanon’s poor. Only due to the good work of such private
charities has some form of safety net been provided to the poorest among the
Lebanese. Lest we forget, it is
from among these desperately poor who feel abandoned by the Lebanese government
and who therefore have no stake in maintaining peace and stability that
“martyrs” are recruited, trained and sent forth to spread death and
destruction beyond Lebanon’s borders.
By meeting the needs of these charitable organizations who are already on
the ground servicing these needs, the United States can fill a vital
humanitarian gap while at the same time addressing a significant factor
impacting the security of the country. NALA
recommends that the Congress continue to fund programs of the Catholic
Near East Welfare Association, operated through the offices of John Cardinal
O'Connor of New York as a worthy PVO to receive and disburse U.S. Aid. This Association, through the Pontifical Mission office in
Lebanon is performing immeasurable work through major programs to bring medical
and housing reconstruction assistance to Lebanon's new class of people living in
poverty. Though this is a charity
of the Catholic Church, it serves anyone in need regardless of their
confessional affiliation.
If we in the West do not act in this regard to meet these needs, Iran,
acting through surrogates such as Hezbollah will continue to be the main source
for this type of assistance. In
Lebanon, Hezbollah is more than a militia.
It is also the provider of hospitals, schools, community homes and many
other forms of social institutions and aid.
With the material comfort that their money buys for the people of
southern Lebanon, the Iranians are also purchasing converts to their cause.
Hezbollah will not be eliminated from southern Lebanon with laser guided
rockets and artillery shells. We
must become engaged in Lebanon to improve the economic lot of the desperately
impoverished people who are currently serving as recruits to join the
"martyr brigades" that strap on bombs and walk into Tel Aviv
restaurants or drive bomb laden trucks into buildings that house American
service men and women. American
humanitarian aid, therefore, has an ideological component to it.
4. American Supported
Lebanese Educational Facilities. There is no better way to
show U.S. support for the country than by investing in American based
institutions of higher learning in Lebanon. The American University of Beirut (AUB)
and the Lebanese American University (LAU) are two distinct examples where
American based education combines with student initiative to produce a long
lasting and effective American influence in the country.
U.S. support for these two universities also demonstrates to all in the
region that the U.S. Government views its commitment to American based education
in the region seriously.
AUB and LAU believe in promoting the Western liberal arts tradition which
helps advance the cause of peace in the Middle East by teaching tolerance and
dialogue in the American tradition as an alternative to extremism and
confrontation. LAU and AUB also
contribute to the economic, social and political viability of Lebanon by
teaching the next generation of Lebanese leaders to think in an open, democratic
and tolerant fashion. In addition,
AUB houses one of the finest medical facilities in the country.
The United States Congress has given steadfast support to these
institutions of higher learning in the past.
Current events in Lebanon underscore the need for a continuing commitment
from the United States to promote learning and tolerance through these
institutions.
The American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) Program, from which
these American schools in Lebanon have applied to obtain their funding is
attacked annually in the budget process. As
NALA has requested in the past, competition for unearmarked USAID funds by these
educational institutions in Lebanon will effectively dry up this vital source of
funding. NALA requests the
Committee to sustain funding for this program, at least at the level
appropriated for FY 2000. In this
regard, NALA wishes to extend to the Chairman, Mr. Callahan, its great
appreciation for your personal intervention in firmly insisting
to the State Department that it supplement is aid package by $3 million
on behalf of the AUB. Mr. Chairman,
your support has been critical in preserving his appropriation and we hope that
you will go to bat again on behalf of this American institution.
AID TO LEBANON WITHIN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
The abiding American
interests in the Middle East for decades has been the create and maintain
stability within and among the states of the region in service to the two over
riding American strategic interests of promoting security of Western access to
the region’s oil resources and security for the State of Israel.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the legacy of the 1991 Gulf War is the
Madrid Conference and the current Arab Israeli Peace Process.
That process, initiated pursuant to America’s interest in the security
of the State of Israel, has to date been the victim of extremists from all
sides.
Now the process is being held hostage to Syrian President Assad’s need
to secure power for his successor, his son Col. Bashar Assad. As recent events have shown, Assad is much too rigid in his
position to be able to negotiate a treaty with Israel at this time.
Yet, Israel has a pressing need to extricate itself from Lebanon, and it
shall, if necessary through a unilateral withdrawal within the context of UNRES
425.
Because Israel may have to go it alone, withdraw without a treaty
guaranteeing security on its border, Lebanon, too, will have to go it alone.
Israel has made it clear that if Lebanon can not control its border by
preventing cross border attacks, then Lebanon will be made the victim of
retaliatory air raids against more infrastructure targets.
In this environment, the United States, rather than lessening its
investment in Lebanon, should instead be increasing aid to Lebanon in all areas
recommended herein if it is to meet the coming challenge successfully.
Due to Syrian rigidity which is blocking the way to a treaty, and the
irrevocable Israeli commitment to withdraw from Lebanon, even in the absence of
a Syrian treaty, the entire region can be either thrown back into war, or settle
into a peaceful status quo depending on the Lebanese response to this challenge.
It
therefore behooves the United States, now that these challenges are clearly
foreseeable, to do its utmost to insure that Lebanon is equipped with the tools
necessary for it to perform its mission of shepherding these talks and the
chance for peace through this most difficult coming period.
Regarding Lebanon, one thing is sure and NALA has so indicated in
meetings with Administration officials. Should
the United States not take an interest in freeing Lebanese democratic
institutions; should the United States not take an interest in creating
conditions in Lebanon designed to rebuild and attract her lost middle class,
then Lebanon will, within 5 to 10 years, not be recognizable as the moderate
Arabic state that we have all known.
Under Syrian hegemony and protection, the Shiite Amal Movement and
Hizbollah have gained extraordinary political power within Lebanon. Through Hizbollah, Iran has found a conduit through which it
funnels aid and ideology into Lebanon. Demographic
trends indicate an exodus of the middle class as the population of poorer
economic classes burgeons with each additional birth being subsidized by an Iran
eager to make of Lebanon an Islamic Republic in its own image.
Today there is no greater political force in Lebanon than Hizbollah.
There is no more organized and rational political movement than Hizbollah
and unless some action is taken by the United States and the West to restore
some form of equilibrium to the Lebanese equation, Israel will awaken one day
and Syria will awaken one day to find a fundamentalist Islamic republic on its
border. CONCLUSION
The areas to which we recommend the application of U.S. foreign aid: 1. Security and
assistance to the Lebanese Army. 2. Aid for
Economic Development 3. Humanitarian
Aid 4. American
Supported Lebanese Educational Facilities,
were not randomly selected. Rather,
it is NALA's recommendation to this Committee that each of these areas be
addressed in order for the United States to become more engaged in Lebanon and
the critical struggle that is now taking place there. NALA recommends the
adoption of its program for Lebanon not only because it will benefit the
Lebanese; not only because by doing so American strategic interests will be
preserved; and not only to blunt the Iranian challenge to American power in the
region. But, because it is the
right thing to do.
Thank you.
|