NALA TESTIMONY TO THE US CONGRESS

SUBMITTED TO THE

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

March 4, 1999

INTRODUCTION

My name is Toufic Baaklini. I am the Chairman of the Government Affairs Committee of the National Alliance of Lebanese Americans (NALA). NALA is a tax exempt charitable organization whose primary mission in the United States is to inform and educate our fellow citizens regarding issues of Lebanese/American interests, and to bring a heightened sense of awareness to our fellow Lebanese Americans of Lebanon's rich cultural heritage, which is seriously threatened by a deepening foreign occupation. NALA wishes to thank the Committee for honoring its request to submit this Testimony to the Subcommittee.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Since the Subcommittee last conducted public hearings on the issue of appropriations for Lebanon, last March, the country has witnessed several conflicting trends in its halting steps taken toward re-emergence as an independent state. I will address those trends in the following areas: security of the nation, economic development and per capita incomes of the people, political developments.

A. Security. Syrian Occupation. Over most of its territory, Lebanon remains a state occupied by neighboring Syria. According to the just released State Department Country Report on Lebanon for Human Rights Practices for 1998, Syria continues to maintain a 25,000 man occupation force in Lebanon which does not operate in any coordinated fashion with the command structure of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Syria also maintains a network of military intelligence personnel operating independently in Lebanon and in non conformance with the 1989 Taif Accord and implementing agreements reached in 1991. These forces undermine the authority of the central government according to the State Department report.

Israeli Occupation. In addition to Syrian forces, there are 2,000 members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operating in the self declared Israeli Security Zone in south Lebanon and 1,500 members of their allied militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

Hizbollah/Israeli War in south Lebanon. These forces throughout 1998 and into 1999 have maintained a running war of attrition with elements of the Hizbollah militia, the Amal militia and various armed groups of Palestinians fighting in and around the Security Zone in South Lebanon monitored by elements of UNIFIL and the 1996 April Understanding Montioring Group established by Former Secretary of State Warren Chistopher in the wake of the April 1996 Grapes of Wrath military operations conducted by Israel in southern Lebanon.

Military operations in south Lebanon during 1998 created 22 casualties within the IDF as the range and scope of those operatations escalated throughout the year. The latest crisis having occurred this week with the first killing a Brigadier General of the IDF in south Lebanon on Sunday February 28, 1999. General Erez Gerstein and 2 other officers were the victims of a road side bomb and this has triggered the current crisis in south Lebanon which could quickly deteriorate into a nation wide security crisis as Israel formulates its response to this incident in the highly charged political context of an Israeli election season.

Concerns have been raised both in Beirut and in Washington, as recently as January 11, 1999 that Israel may strike at Syrian positions in Lebanon in a large scale attack in an attempt to get Syria to rein in Hizbollah, with which the Israelis have demonstrated considerable frustration. In an attempt to get Syria=s attention, Israel has conducted military operations in Syrian controlled sectors of Lebanon on January 5, 1999 and on January 11 struck near regional electrical power stations in Sidon in an attempt to get the attention of the Lebanese Government to take action against Hizbollah.

Attempts to Implement UN RES425. In an attempt to diplomatically address this problem, the Israeli Cabinet, on April 1, 1998 unanimously adopted implementation of UN Resolution 425 (1978) and made as a part of Israeli policy withdrawing from its self declared security zone in southern Lebanon. The U.S. Administration welcomed the action which was condemned in Syria, Iran and Lebanon. Efforts were made throughout last year to find a means by which this policy could be implemented. The hanging point was over Israel=s condition that the Lebanese government commit to deployment of the Lebanese Army (LAF) into the zone to take up its positions and maintain security on the border. The Lebanese government, echoing the position of the Syrian occupiers insisted that the resolution be implemented without condition or any negotiation whatsoever regarding alternative security provisions.

The Israeli plan was ultimately shelved last September, a victim to the linkage that exists between any movement toward security arrangements in Lebanon to progress on the Syrian negotiation track, which, in turn is hostage to progress on the Palestinian negotiation track and implementation of the Oslo Accords of 1993 between the PA and Israel.

The Peace Process. The State Department labored all year to bring the parties together with Secretary Albright, Special Ambassador Ross and Assistant Secretary Indyk making trips out to the region for meetings, conducting meetings in London, New York and finally in the Washington area at Wye Plantation. The Wye Plantation Talks which started on October 15, 1998 resulted in an Accord on October 23, 1998 after the President of the United States invested 70 hours and the late King Hussein of Jordan interrupted cancer treatments at the Mayo Clinic to travel to Maryland and save the talks from collapse. The centerpiece of the Accord was a formula by which Israel would pull back from 13% of West Bank Territory, ceding control to the PA in a three step phased withdrawal.

Though the Israeli Parliament approved the Accord on November 18, 1998 on a 75-19 vote, 11 members of Netanyahu=s 17 member cabinet either voted against it, abstained or were absent when the vote was taken. This prompted the Israeli Parliament to advance scheduled elections for Prime Minister from the year 2000 forward to May 17, 1999.

Netanyahu was widely denounced by right wing Israeli settlers for his participation in Wye and Hamas and Hizbollah condemned Arafat for his role. In fact, Hizbollah ordered the killing of Arafat for his role.

Despite this, only the first phase of withdrawals actually took place before Netanyahu froze any further action on December 2, 1998 citing violations of the Accord by the PA in 4 major areas. Many observers saw the action by Netanyahu as steps to placate certain elements of his coalition and hold his government together. Nevertheless, today, as we meet, despite all of the effort put forth to secure the Wye Accord, it is frozen, and with it, any progress on ending the carnage in southern Lebanon which only threatens to get worse.

Hizbollah has been emboldened in recent weeks by its daring attacks against Israeli positions and personnel in south Lebanon. On September 18, 1998, Israeli Chief of Staff General Mofaz admitted that Hizbollah anti aircraft firepower, consisting of Soviet made 57mm guns mounted on flat bed trucks, has effectively challenged Israeli control of Lebanese airspace. He also stated that Hizbollah deploys missiles and mortars provided by Iran. There is a quantitative and qualitative upgrade in the military force deployed by Hizbollah resistance fighters in the south.

On February 19, 1999 Israel attempted to annex the Lebanese village of Arnoun into the Security Zone by constructing earthen ramparts and stringing barbed wire around the perimeter of the village. Politically, the resolution of the Arnoun crisis as worked to Hizbollah=s favor. After much diplomatic maneuvering involving the UN and the 1996 April Understanding Monitoring Group, 2,000 Lebanese demonstrators took matters into their own hands. On February 25, 1999 they stormed the ramparts and retook the western part of the village under Israeli guns which were mounted in Beuford Castle which overlooks the city. This was widely seen in Lebanon as national support for the Hizbollah led resistance movement in south Lebanon.

Economic and Per Capita Incomes. The Lebanese economy continued to

labor under a liquidity crisis through much of 1998 as the economic stagnation was fueled by many factors, least of which was the continued depressed prices for Persian Gulf Oil resources.

In August an economic report was released by the government indicating that the government budget deficit crisis had eased somewhat. In 1997, the deficit ran to 59% of all government expenditures. In 1998, the government was aiming at a 42% deficit, but ended the year with a 50% deficit. Austerity programs have been instituted in an effort to run the deficit down to 5-7% of all government expenditures in the coming year.

The government=s stated plan of economic restoration is a three step process which includes stabilizing the currency, then stabilizing the budget and then implementing reforms. To date, the currency has been stabilized at an exchange rate of 1510-1540 lira/$1.00. Following the national elections last Fall, that exchange rate went to 1508 lira/$1.00.

The government is currently attempting to control its budget and implement needed reforms to the system. However, due to spotty enforcement of its tax laws, the government is taking action on its deficit by cutting the government payroll substantially thereby eliminating a significant number of public sector jobs and curtailing spending across the board, at a time when government fiscal intervention is needed. Due to the massive debt burden built up since 1992 with the start of reconstruction, the government=s bond rating does not support additional massive borrowing to fund ever growing deficits.

1/3 of the Lebanese below Poverty. Economic problems nevertheless persist. On October 22, 1998 The Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon Study of the UN Development Program (UNDP) issued its findings. It found that 35.2% of the total population, or 1,095,000 individuals living in 214,000 households live in Lebanon without basic living requirements. Basic living requirements have been defined by the UNDP as including such things as heated living space, an education and personal transportation. The study found that 58% of these persons live in Beirut and its suburbs and that 60% of the heads of households for these persons work but that wages are so low that they can not meet basic living requirements.

The study concluded that the cure for this massive problem is the formulation of policies aimed at raising wages, creating more job opportunities and to lower the cost of commodities and services such as health and education.

The day after the release of the findings, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon David Satterfield announced that the United States was keen to increase aid to Lebanon and to improve U.S.-Lebanon ties. Indeed, in light of the restricted ability of the Lebanese government to meet these needs at this time, increased U.S. aid from USAID accounts is in order.

USAID projects in Lebanon are currently addressing some of these needs and recommendations of the UNDP. In the northern province of Akkar, USAID is spending $250,000 on the following projects:

In Qobeiyat the construction of a three floor vegetable market for local agricultural products;

In Andaqit on the construction of a sewage network and agricultural pathways as well as an irrigation network to supply water to 180 hectars of cultivated land.

In Mashta Hassan on the rehabilitation of a school, and

In Tlayl funds are being spent to construct a new school.

U.S. Trade Missions to Lebanon in 1998. In the private sector, since the travel ban to Lebanon from the United States was lifted in July 1997, American business has reentered the Lebanese market. Currently the United States is the second largest exporter to Lebanon behind Italy, but ahead of France and Germany. Lebanon purchases over $900 million/year of American goods and services. On October 13, 1998 an American trade mission toured Lebanon headed by Joseph Grandmaison, director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA). He was accompanied by Kirk Robinson, President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Opic). It is the policy of the United States, as announced by Ambassador Satterfield to encourage the reintroduction of U.S. business interests into Lebanon and these missions are taken pursuant to that policy.

The highlight of the year for such missions was the visit by U.S. Commerce Secretary Bill Daley to Beirut on November 13, 1998. He was there to boost bilateral trade deals and while there set down the marker to the Lebanese of the conditions for continued and increased U.S. participation in Lebanon=s reconstruction. He said, ALebanon would have to rid itself of corruption and inefficiency if commercial links with American companies were to stand a chance of developing.@

A It does not make sense,@ he said, Ato bring companies here, and to know that these companies will bring jobs to Lebanon, and then to be less than open and transparent when it comes to the time for the to bid for the work.@

The immediate fruits of the Daley trade mission was the awarding of a $53 million contract to Radian International of Texas for the contract to clear the massive environmental hazard of Normandy landfill in the central Beirut district.

Negative Developments. Despite these positive developments, Lebanon is still burdened with the presence of over one million Syrian workers in Lebanon who are seriously underbidding skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled work away from Lebanese workers and then remitting the funds to family in Syria. This poses a serious drain on the Lebanese economy at a time when it is trying to re-emerge from years of war and neglect. The Lebanese government is powerless to protest this drain as it finds itself bound to Syria as a dominated partner in bilateral economic treaties which condone this practice that is beneficial to Syria.

In addition there are, according tot he United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon which pose an additional economic burden on the country.

Political Developments. Municipal Elections. Politically the past year has

seen a mixed bag of results in Lebanon. In late May and early June, 1998, the Lebanese participated in the first municipal elections since 1963. The process was free and fair with members of opposition parties participating and winning local elections on confessionally mixed ballots. This election established after years of war and years of denial of this basic of human rights, the right to elect one=s government, that the Lebanese embrace this right and practice it with some degree of sophistication.

Presidental Elections On the national level, Lebanon conducted a presidential election as the successor to President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri were chosen. After 9 years in office, Hrawi stepped aside and Emile Lahoud, former Army General was elected by Parliament on October 15, 1998 and he took office peacefully on November 24, 1998. He ran on a platform calling for the end to institutionalized graft and corruption in the government and the establishment of Atransparent@ practices in all affairs of the government. His reform government took almost immediate action in ousting from embedded bureaucratic positions employees of past regimes that had been connected to the institutionalization of corrupt practices.

The new president apparently took up the challenge of Commerce Secretary Daley that in order for the Lebanese private economy to grow and flourish, creating the necessary jobs and income to sustain the people, the burden of government corruption and inefficiency had to be addressed and addressed forcefully and this the new president is attempting.

To the negative side, Lahoud=s election was less of an election and more of a selection made by Hafez al Assad of Syria. In a mockery of Lebanese democratic processes established by its constitution for the orderly succession of power in the government, Assad, on October 4, 1998, in the midst of a multi-party campaign, announced his support for Lahoud. The immediate result of that announcement was the withdrawal from the race of all other candidates and the rubber stamp approval of Lahoud by the Lebanese Parliament after amending the constitution in order for Lahoud to even be eligible to be considered for the office.

On November 30, 1998 Rafik Hariri indicated that he would not consent to another term as prime minister and on December 2, 1998 Salem al Hoss was chosen as the Prime Minister. A reform cabinet of technocrats were appointed to the Council of Ministers.

Despite the reform minded nature of the new government, the means by which it was selected, the continued presence of 25,000 Syrian troops and unknown numbers of Syrian intelligence officers renders this government as susceptible to Syrian control and manipulation as the last government. Syria is a country that on July 14, 1998 despite the American led embargo on Iraqi oil exports reopened the long dormant Iraqi pipeline that traverses Syria to a Mediterranean terminal on the Syrian coast. In December, let us not forget that Syrian security and army personnel sat idly by while Syrian demonstrators stormed the American Embassy compound in Damascus and tore down the American flag and endangered U.S. diplomatic personnel. The consulate section was closed for weeks as a result.

Because the current Lebanese government can not find it within its power to accept the return of sovereign Lebanese territory from an occupying force in deference to the demands and requirements of the Syrian government with regard to implementation of UN RES425; and because the Lebanese government can not find it within its power to take action on behalf of Lebanese workers by restricting the entry of Syrian workers into Lebanon=s labor markets, this government has not, to date, demonstrated the type of independence required to entrust it as the facilitating institution of U.S. aid. Therefore, NALA continues to recommend to this committee that the Lebanese Government be bypassed as an instrument for delivering American aid to Lebanon. Lebanon remains a party to a number of interlocking treaty obligations with the Syrian government so that the United States could not know whether any aid entrusted to the Lebanese government would actually be used for its intended purpose in Lebanon, or would be simply funneled to Damascus.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AID

Despite the political and economic realities in Lebanon today, but rather, because of them, NALA recommends to the Committee that the United States Government follow the recommendations of Ambassador Satterfield by sustaining and expanding its aid to Lebanon. Lebanon is a key to American interests in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. A strong American presence is needed in Lebanon to counter the Iranian/Syrian efforts to subvert American diplomacy and interests in the region.

The litany of ills which beset Lebanon today are recited herein not as a rationale for the United States to abandon Lebanon, but rather to define and measure the challenge that we face to restore it as a stable moderate Arabic republic. Past efforts by the Administration to encourage the evolution of a more independent political leadership in Lebanon are beginning to take root. The effort needs to be continued and sustained. Lebanon did not become a vassal state overnight and it will not emerge from its subservient status over night. NALA recommends the following areas to be addressed in the Foreign Operations budget for Lebanon:

Security and assistance to the Lebanese Army. Of first priority must be the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This is a 62,000 standing man force, of which 23,000 are conscripts. The Lebanese government appropriated 749,970,000 lira ($487 million) on its military in 1998. It is equipped with the following:

This is a purely defensive force. It works in conjunction with Internal Security Forces as needed such as its action in putting down the Toufaili insurrection in Baalbek in 1997 and an earlier action against Palestinian militia in Tripoli. In the event of an Israeli withdrawal under any of the various programs forwarded from several quarters as a means for implementation of UN RES425, the LAF will be called upon to perform security duty in southern Lebanon.

Currently the LAF participates in the Excess Defense Article (EDA) program for the transfer of surplus U.S. military equipment for nominal prices. For example, last year, the LAF took a shipment of 3000 surplus U.S. Army Jeeps at a cost of $100 per vehicle. The shipments are from non-lethal U.S. military surplus stocks. This program needs to be expanded.

The LAF also participates in the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program for officer training. The Army in Lebanon remains as the most respected national institution among the Lebanese people. Under the Military Assistance and Voluntary Peacekeeping section of the budget proposal for FY 2000, the Administration proposes to spend $52,000,000 on the IMET program. The officers of the Lebanese Armed Forces have been a traditional component beneficiary of that program over the years and NALA strongly recommends that its participation continue and expand. Lebanon participates currently in this program through the Mobile Training Teams (MTT) program whereby Lebanon, rather than send its officers to the United States, pays the U.S. government to send its officers to Lebanon for training of Lebanese personnel. NALA requests that in order to enhance this program that the United States allocate funds for these American teams to travel to Lebanon for training of the LAF officers. By supplementation of the expenditures currently made by the Lebanese government on this program, it can be expanded.

The United States already has a substantial investment in this force. It is a very professional force. Through officer participation in the IMET program, its upper echelons are schooled in Western ideology of respect for civilian authority and democratic processes. If and when Lebanese independence re-emerges, a strong national army will be a requisite. It is an investment in the future.

If the United States does not provide this officer training, these officers will receive their training in Syria. This process has already begun. To the extent that it persists, then this vital institution to the re-emergence of Lebanese democracy will have been infected with an ideology that is alien to the concept of civilian control of the military.

Aid for Economic Development. The U.S. to date has allocated $12 million to U.S. AID Lebanon projects, some of which were referenced above. This amount has been fixed for 5 years. These projects have two objectives, namely, the promotion of economic opportunity and the promotion of democracy, with a special emphasis on the environment.

As the UNDP study showed, the best solution to the widening gap between rich and poor in Lebanon is the creation of more economic opportunity. The United States has a security interest in closing this gap which will be discussed below. NALA recommends to the Subcommittee that following Foreign Operations Accounts be the source of this aid:

International Organizations & Programs FY 2000 request of $293 million. Included in this account are programs to improve the welfare of mothers and children, feed the malnourished, and protect the environment. Furthermore, $80 million of this account is recommended to the UN Development Program which conducted the Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon Study referenced above.

Development Assistance (DP) Account for which the Administration recommends for FY 2000 $1,848 million. This account funds programs supporting economic growth and agricultural development, environmental sustainability and democracy. Its director, Mr. Grandmaison toured Lebanon last year and from this account economic assistance is recommended to be allocated to Lebanon.

Finally, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), recommended FY 2000 appropriation of $2,389 million has $1,943 million earmarked for the Middle East. This aid supports the economic and political foreign policy interests of the U.S. by providing financial assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy. The Administration is proposing the following allocations to regional states:

In addition there is a request of $10 million for Iraqi opposition groups. The only country with an emerging democracy, Lebanon is without reason not included in the appropriation.

Promotion of Democracy. These same programs listed above also have as their purpose the promotion of democracy. NALA recommends to the committee, the Rene Muawad Foundation as an appropriate PVO facilitator for this aid. National Endowment for Democracy, last year granted the Muawad Foundation $50,000 for its programs operated in Lebanon for the promotion of democracy.

In meetings conducted in Beirut by representatives of NALA with Nayla Muawad (MP), the President of the foundation, she outlined the efforts of the foundation to bring about a Third Force in Lebanese politics. It is a cross confessional effort to bring together the best elements in the society to work together toward addressing the country=s problems in the areas of development of the country=s human resources, its economy and taking steps to preserve the environment.

The Foundation has done work in addressing Lebanon=s Abrain drain@ , the crisis in the quality of public education and other planning to address the country=s pressing needs to avoid the slippage of Lebanon into a permanent third world status.

Humanitarian Aid. NALA requests that the Congress give serious consideration to address the growing chasm between rich and poor in Lebanon which is going unaddressed by the Lebanese government. Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVO=s) which qualify under the provisions of Title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1985 [Public Law 98-473] are on the ground and operational in Lebanon performing excellent work among Lebanon=s poor. Only due to the good work of such private charities has some form of safety net been provided to the poorest among the Lebanese. Lest we forget, it is from among these desperately poor who feel abandoned by the Lebanese government and who therefore have no stake in maintaining peace and stability that Amartyrs@ are recruited, trained and sent forth to spread death and destruction beyond Lebanon=s borders. By meeting the needs of these charitable organizations who are already on the ground servicing these needs, the United States can fill a vital humanitarian gap while at the same time addressing a significant factor impacting the security of the country. NALA recommends that the Congress continue to fund programs of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, operated through the offices of John Cardinal O'Connor of New York as a worthy PVO to receive and disburse U.S. Aid. This Association, through the Pontifical Mission office in Lebanon is performing immeasurable work through major programs to bring medical and housing reconstruction assistance to Lebanon's new class of people living in poverty. Though this is a charity of the Catholic Church, it serves anyone in need regardless of their confessional affiliation.

NALA also recommends to the Committee an appropriation of $3.5 million from the Child Survival and Diseases Programs Fund (CS/D) or other appropriate account for the construction of a hospital to serve the people of the Chouf District at Deir al Kamar. The project is to be managed through Caritas - Lebanon which NALA recommends as the PVO to be used for the facilitation of this project. Currently there is no hospital to serve the children and families of this region which are in desperate need. The Chouf is a district of particular concern to the Ministry for Displaced Persons. Many of the Chouf residence who fled the fighting have yet to return and their homes are coming to be occupied by persons who come from outside the district and even outside of the country. A hospital in this district is seen as an essential element of the infrastructure to not only serve the needs of the people, but to attract the residence back to their home districts and away from crowded refugee districts.

If we in the West do not act in this regard to meet these, Iran, acting through surrogates such as Hezbollah will continue to be the main source for this type of assistance. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is more than a militia. It is also the provider of hospitals, schools, community homes and many other forms of social institutions and aid. With the material comfort that their money buys for the people of southern Lebanon, the Iranians are also purchasing converts to their cause. Hezbollah will not be eliminated from southern Lebanon with laser guided rockets and artillery shells. We must become engaged in Lebanon to improve the economic lot of the desperately impoverished people who are currently serving as recruits to join the "martyr brigades" that strap on bombs and walk into Tel Aviv restaurants or drive bomb laden trucks into buildings that house American service men and women. American humanitarian aid, therefore, has an ideological component to it.

American Supported Lebanese Educational Facilities. There is no better way to show U.S. support for the country than by investing in American based institutions of higher learning in Lebanon. The American University of Beirut (AUB) and the Lebanese American University (LAU) are two distinct examples where American based education combines with student initiative to produce a long lasting and effective American influence in the country. U.S. support for these two universities also demonstrates to all in the region that the U.S. Government views its commitment to American based education in the region seriously.

AUB and LAU believe in promoting the Western liberal arts tradition which helps advance the cause of peace in the Middle East by teaching tolerance and dialogue in the American tradition as an alternative to extremism and confrontation. LAU and AUB also contribute to the economic, social and political viability of Lebanon by teaching the next generation of Lebanese leaders to think in an open, democratic and tolerant fashion. In addition, AUB houses one of the finest medical facilities in the country.

The United States Congress has given steadfast support to these institutions of higher learning in the past. Current events in Lebanon underscore the need for a continuing commitment from the United States to promote learning and tolerance through these institutions.

The American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) Program, from which these American schools in Lebanon have applied to obtain their funding is attacked annually in the budget process. As NALA has requested in the past, competition for unearmarked USAID funds by these educational institutions in Lebanon will effectively dry up this vital source of funding. NALA requests the Committee to sustain funding for this program, at least at the level appropriated for FY 1999. In this regard, NALA wishes to extend to the Chairman, Mr. Callahan, its great appreciation for your personal intervention in firmly insisting to the State Department that it preserve is aid package of $2 million on behalf of the AUB. Mr. Chairman, your support has been critical in preserving his appropriation and we hope that you will go to bat again on behalf of this American institution. State is once again, attempting to terminate this funding funding.

The abiding American interests in the Middle East for decades has been the create and maintain stability within and among the states of the region in service to the two over riding American interests of promoting security of Western access to the region=s oil resources and security for the State of Israel. Both of those interests are at risk today.

The American policy of double containment of Iran and Iraq as a means of providing for security in the Gulf is largely in shambles. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, fought to protect Western access to oil resources, no fly zones were established in northern and southern Iraq. Today, 8 years later, U.S. and British pilots are being targeted by Iraqi anti aircraft missile sites and the U.S. is engaged in an air war over Iraq. The situation in Iraq is quite unstable and it is the policy of the United States to make it more so by our support of Iraqi opposition groups with a recommended $10 million dollar appropriation in the ESF budget. Should we succeed in that effort, the long term result will be a replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq; short term this policy will create a great deal of instability within Iraq and among her neighbors which are the oil producing states.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the legacy of the 1991 Gulf War is the Madrid Conference and the current Arab Israeli Peace Process. That process, initiated pursuant to America=s interest in the security of the State of Israel, has to date been the victim of extremists from all sides. The two moderate leaders who made the process real, Yitzshak Rabin of Israel and King Hussein of Jordan have both left the regional stage, Rabin the victim of hatred in November 1995 as he fell to an assassin=s bullet and Hussein the victim of cancer in February 1999. Their passing has left a huge vacuum in the peace process.

Rabin was the warrior who had come to see the vision of security for Israel through peace with her neighbors and was running toward that light trying desperately to bring his people with him when one of his own assassinated him. He has been replaced by Netanyahu, a man blinded to the opportunities for peace by his insatiable desire for security. Since his election in May 1996 the peace process has been derailed. The two notable advances, Hebron in February 1997 and Wye Plantation in November 1998 have been still born victories for the process. Netanyahu=s policy of placating the Americans with promises of peaceful compromise, while at the same time placating his right wing with assertions never to give an inch have created such a credibility gap between himself and the leaders of other regional states that all good will earned by Rabin and then Peres have been exhausted. There is no trust and without trust there can be no peace.

Hussein was a giant around whom a country was justified and existed. His country shares the longest border with the State of Israel and up to the time of his death, the most stable border. The Jordanian treaty with Israel has created a real peace, not a cold one as exists between Israel and Egypt. With the passing of Hussein and the ascent of his son King Abdullah, the future of Jordan is now at issue. A succession by Crown Prince Hassan that had before given some assurance to neighboring states, was with one word from the King, undone and a son with one week=s notice has assumed the leadership of Jordan.

Within one week of the Hussein=s death, Yasir Arafat was already proposing a confederation with the PA. In light of the fact that Jordan is 60% Palestinian, this is an open play by Arafat for extending the writ of his authority into Jordan. Such a move can only alarm and compel Assad in Syria, Saddam in Iraq and Fahid in Saudi Arabia to take counter measures to insure some zone of control in Jordan should Arafat succeed. King Abdullah is faced immediately with a very delicate problem in addressing Arafat=s entreaties in that if he turns him down, he can alienate the Palestinian majority that lives in Jordan, if he accepts, he risks partition of Jordan.

The last thing Israeli security needs at this point is to have Iraq and Syria any closer to its borders. For this reason, the U.S. has responded with aid to Jordan in the hundreds of millions of dollars. However we run the risk in so doing, of exposing King Abdullah to criticism as an American retainer and thus giving the enemies of Abdullah the justification they need to undo him and Jordan.

With the specter of instability having been increased by the air war over Iraq, the succession crisis in Jordan, the moribund Peace Process on the West Bank and the escalating war of attrition in south Lebanon between Israel and the Hizbollah resistance, American interests in the region are not being served well at all.

In this environment, Lebanon can still provide the United States with a zone of stability. Contrary to the remonstrations of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Lebanon is not a Anon-country@. Of all of Israel=s neighbors Lebanon is the only state with functioning democratic institutions and processes. Though it is true that Syria took control of the electoral process in determining the election of the new president, it can not be denied that Lebanon at least has a democratic institutional solution to the issue of succession of its national leadership and that formula was followed in the election of President Emile Lahoud and the selection of Prime Minister al Hoss.

Syria can not say the same with regard to the succession issue that will come following the departure of Assad who has held power since 1970; Iraq can not say the same with regard to the succession issue that will follow the departure of Saddam who has held power since 1980; Egypt can not say the same with regard to the succession issue that will follow the departure of Mubarak who has held power since 1981; nor can Saudi Arabia say the same with regard to its succession issues.

Regarding Lebanon, one thing is sure and NALA has so indicated in meetings with Administration officials. Should the United States not take an interest in freeing Lebanese democratic institutions; should the United States not take an interest in creating conditions in Lebanon designed to rebuild and attract her lost middle class, then Lebanon will, within 5 to 10 years, not be recognizable as the moderate Arabic state that we have all known.

Under Syrian hegemony and protection, the Shiite Amal Movement and Hizbollah have gained extraordinary political power within Lebanon. Through Hizbollah, Iran has found a conduit through which it funnels aid and ideology into Lebanon. Demographic trends indicate an exodus of the middle class as the population of poorer economic classes burgeons with each additional birth being subsidized by an Iran eager to make of Lebanon an Islamic Republic in its own image. Today there is no greater political force in Lebanon than Hizbollah. There is no more organized and rational political movement than Hizbollah and unless some action is taken by the United States and the West to restore some form of equilibrium to the Lebanese equation, Israel will awaken one day and Syria will awaken one day to find a fundamentalist Islamic republic on its border.

were not randomly selected. Rather, it is NALA's recommendation to this Committee that each of these areas be addressed in order for the United States to become more engaged in Lebanon and the critical struggle that is now taking place there. NALA recommends the adoption of its program for Lebanon not only because it will benefit the Lebanese; not only because by doing so American interests will be preserved; and not only to blunt the Iranian challenge to American power in the region. But, because it is the right thing to do.