THE DOMESTICATION OF HEZBOLLAH

June 23, 2005

Background

            After thirty years of war and occupation, the people of Lebanon have worked miracles in the Spring of 2004, taking giant leaps toward the recovery of their national independence.   

As late as August 28, 2004, the dictate from Syria was executed by the Lebanese Parliament in voting to amend the constitution in order to allow for President Emile Lahoud to extend his mandate for an additional 3 years.[1]  Twenty-nine Deputies voted against the constitutional amendment which there after passed.  Internationally the response to the Syrian usurpation was swift and immediate as the international community came to the side of the Lebanese people against this rather blatant exercise of hegemony and control by the Syrian government over its captive state.  On September 2, 2004, the United Nations Security Council approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 which called for the immediate end of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.  The resolution calls for, among other things the following:

“1. The strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon;

“2.  The withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon;

“3. The disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;

“4. The extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;

“5. The support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence;”[2] 

            Lebanese Parliamentary elections originally scheduled for May 2004 were moved forward by 8 months in order to allow the Parliament elected in 2000 to serve as electors for the new Lebanese President, who was due to be elected in October 2004.  However, with the growing Opposition movement within Parliament, the election was cancelled when Syria dictated the extension of the Lahoud presidential mandate by forcing an amendment of the Lebanese Constitution.  Parliament then extended its mandate for another 4 months to May of 2005 with elections to take place in May 2005.  However, there was difficulty in deciding upon a new electoral law to govern the elections in the wake of the international uproar over the manner in which the Presidential election was cancelled as well as the events of the Spring of 2005. 

            The Lebanese Opposition had grown from the 29 Deputies who had voted against extension to now include the PSP Parliamentary bloc of Walid Jumblatt.  On September 6, 2004, Marwan Hamadeh, Minister of Economy and Trade in Hariri's fifth government (April 17, 2003 - October 26, 2004) resigned in protest against the extension of the mandate for Emile Lahoud’s presidency.  On October 1, 2004, he was the victim of a car bombing that almost took his life.[3] This was a signal to Walid Jumblatt not to court favor with the growing Opposition Movement.  However, the near assassination of his close friend and associate, Marwan Hamadeh, rather than slow the move of Jumblatt to the Opposition, accelerated it.   

            With Jumblatt began the move of the Hariri Parliamentary bloc toward the growing Opposition movement.  Hariri, in fact was instrumental in beginning the momentum through his contacts with French President Jacque Chirac and the launching of UNRES 1559. 

            By February 14, 2005, Rafiq Hariri, who had resigned his position as Lebanese Prime Minister effective October 20, 2004[4], had come to the point of declaring openly his joining the Opposition coalition when he was assassinated by a truck bomb near the St. Georges Hotel in downtown Beirut. 

            The murder of Rafiq Hariri, widely believed to have been the work of Syrian intelligence working through elements of the Lebanese Intelligence services, triggered spontaneous mass demonstrations in Beirut.  On February 28, as a result of the demonstrations, Prime Minister Omar Karami resigned his office as Lebanese Prime Minister which caused a crisis in the government. 

            On March 8, 2005, Hezbollah sponsored a massive pro-Syrian, pro-government demonstration which resulted in President Lahoud reappointing Karami to serve as Prime Minister.  Karami indicated that he would serve over a Cabinet of National Unity and sought inclusion of various elements of the Opposition Coalition, which refused to join unless there was a full investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and a resignation of all security and intelligence chiefs. 

            On March 14, 2005, the Opposition responded to the pro-Syrian demonstrations of a week earlier with an outpouring over 1.3 million people in a rare show of cross confessional unity. With this historic demonstration called the Cedar Revolution, the Cross and Crescent, the Beirut Spring, The Lebanese people gave notice to the international community that they could no longer tolerate their nation being a captive of Syria.  The international order by which Syria remained in control of Lebanon had to change. 

            Through the combined efforts of the United States, France, the European Union and the United Nations, sufficient diplomatic, economic and political pressure was brought to bear upon the Syrian regime so that the costs of its remaining in Lebanon came to far outweigh the benefits of its continued occupation.  By April 27, 2007, the last of the Syrian Occupation Army and Intelligence officers had evacuated Lebanon. 

Hezbollah and the Occupation Regime in Lebanon 

            The old regime of Lebanon had been rationalized by and predicated upon the Syrian occupation.  The government derived its power from the Syrian Occupation Army and its allied Intelligence Services operating in Lebanon.  That power base evaporated with the evacuation of the Syrian Army and Intelligence Officers from Lebanon, leaving as political orphans those politicians who had no constituency base among the Lebanese people.  Emile Lahoud is one such orphan; the recently concluded Parliamentary elections have identified many others. 

            The elections, however have not identified Hezbollah as a political orphan in Lebanon.  Hezbollah, as a movement, a party and an armed force grew in Syrian Occupied Lebanon to the point that it has developed its own base of support among the  Shiite community particularly in the south, in the Bekaa-Hermal districts and in the southern suburbs of the capital, Beirut.  Hezbollah’s influence among its Lebanese constituency is based on twin pillars: 

First is the resistance movement.  The people of South Lebanon have a genuine fear of a clear and present danger of Israeli encroachment upon their land.  Whether this fear is real or perceived, it exists among a sizable portion of the population.  They see Hezbollah as providing a tangible military defense that can deter Israeli military encroachments without relying upon the Lebanese Army or government and thus shielding the Lebanese government from Israeli reprisals for military actions undertaken by Hezbollah.  While this rationalization may have worked when Lebanon was under Syrian occupation and the international community recognized Syrian control over Hezbollah, the idea of shielding the Lebanese government from reprisals through the modality of Hezbollah initiated military action against Israel, with the end of occupation, such rationalizations no longer hold.

The second rationale for Hezbollah arms is the fact that the Palestinians in the Lebanese based refugee camps retain their arms and that due to various political constraints upon the Lebanese Army, the Hezbollah is a better deterrent to the Palestinian refugees using their arms against the people of Lebanon.  Many forget that the original rationale for the creation of Hezbollah was to serve as a defense force against the PLO which had operated freely in south Lebanon terrorizing the largely Shiite population. The PLO in Lebanon is comprised primarily of Sunni Muslims. 

            The second pillar of Hezbollah popularity is the social programs that it operates and funds for its constituency.  Hezbollah oversees a far reaching social safety net set of programs that include education, heath care, as well as housing and feeding programs for the poor.   The Lebanese government has traditionally not prioritized social programs for the poor, but rather has served the constituencies which have power and influence in the government. The traditional ruling parties have been Christians from Beirut, Mount Lebanon and the North as well as the Sunni Moslems.  The Shiites who form the demographic majority in south Lebanon have had only the Speaker of Parliament to champion their causes in the government.  Hezbollah has found a human need among the people and moved to fill it.  This has created a very loyal following among the constituents so served.

Hezbollah in the New Post Occupation Regime at a Crossroad           

In the 2005 Parliament just elected, Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies have won 14 seats.  In the 2000 Parliament, Hezbollah had only 12 seats. There has been a net gain in these free elections which serve as testament to the fact that either the 2000 election law, crafted by Syria, artificially favors Hezbollah, or that Hezbollah is actually a bona fide constituency based political movement within Lebanon. The truth may lie somewhere in between. 

            Hezbollah is at a crossroads at this point in time in on the regional.  With Iran, the source of its spiritual leadership and to a large extent its financial patron, exploring its own regional aspirations, Hezbollah has decisions to make.  In the past, while much of its operational ability relied upon the fact that Lebanon was occupied by Iran’s regional ally Syria, Hezbollah was very much responsive to the regional strategy of Syria and Iran which was to confront Israel and to maintain low level military activity on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. 

            The regional political situation however is in great fluctuation.  Syria is no longer the occupier of Lebanon. Though it is trying to find ways to re-enter the picture, the results of the recently concluded Parliamentary elections in which many of its benefactors either did not seek election or actually lost seats in Parliament, indicate that Syrian hegemony in internal Lebanese affairs is substantially diminished. Without Syria as the necessary logistical conduit between Iran and Hezbollah, the regional role of Hezbollah may now be lessened.  Syria remains under severe diplomatic pressure from the United States due to its policy of maintaining an open border with Iraq and allowing the infiltration of insurgents and the funding of their operations with funds which are flowing through Syrian financial institutions.[5]   

            In order to become fully integrated into the Lebanese political system, Hezbollah has been faced with a choice of either shedding some of its militant activities which had a regional rationale, or else develop an internal Lebanese rationale in order to sustain those activities and keep its options open.  Thus, the Hezbollah rationale for maintaining its arms for defense of south Lebanon vis a vis the Israelis, and as a deterrent against the armed presence of Palestinians in the refugee camps have gained prominence. 

A.  Addressing the Domestic Rationales for Hezbollah Arms is the Key  

            In examining avenues toward peacefully disarming Hezbollah, the domestic rationales are best addressed.  Once these have been met and removed, Hezbollah would then be placed in a position of developing regional rationales to remain armed which would directly contradict and militate against its most likely avenue of development as a domestic political party within the context of the Lebanese political system.  It is our estimation that if given this option, of being forced to either rationalize its arms on regional considerations, or surrendering its arms in order to become fully engaged as a domestic Lebanese political party, Hezbollah will opt for the latter. 

            This is only true because at this point in time the regional picture is in such fluctuation with the future so uncertain, that the Lebanese route of development for the Party has the most appeal.  If the regional situation clears, and it will, then the calculations with regard to the future of Hezbollah can change, as well. 

1.  Shebaa Farms. 

            The first reason for Hezbollah retaining its arms is to protect the south against Israeli military incursions. The issue of the Shebaa Farms is the focal point of this rationale.  It is the position of Hezbollah that Shebaa Farms is sovereign Lebanese territory that remains under Israeli occupation and that until it is liberated Hezbollah must remain armed.  As the graphic below shows, the village of Shebaa lies on the Lebanese side of the “Blue Line”, which was the line established by the UNIFIL as the line to which the Israeli Army was to withdraw from Lebanon under UNRES 425.  The Israeli Army completed this withdrawal, conformity with the requirements of UN resolution, on May 22, 2000.[6]

[7]

            Shebaa Farms, which is land owned by the people who live in the village of Shebaa, lies on the Syrian side of the line established by the United Nations.

The Hezbollah claim that the Shebaa Farms District is sovereign Lebanese territory is a claim based upon what is known as the Paulet-Newcombe line which represents the boundary established between the French colonial mandates of Lebanon and Syria to the north and the British mandate of Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the south.  This was the old colonial frontier which the Israelis have from time to time advocated as the proper boundary to be established between Lebanon and Syria and Israel.  The Paulet-Newcombe map of 1923 establishes the international frontier between Lebanon and Israel. The 1923 colonial demarcation line is recognized and was incorporated into the Armistice Agreement Line of 1949 by which the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was resolved with reference to Lebanon.

However, further east, Paulet-Newcombe is not followed in all respects in establishing the Armistice line defining the international frontier between Syria and Israel.[8]  In this regard there is variance from the line, but it is difficult to determine exactly where the boundary should be established.  The same is true in establishing the frontier between Lebanon and Syria on the eastern slope of Mount Hermon. The Shebaa Farms dispute exists along this portion of the border that is common to Lebanon and Syria, but which does not involve Israel.

When detailed maps of the border region were prepared by French and British colonial authorities during World War II, the Shebaa Farms district was shown in Syrian territory, but the commission, made responsible for demarcating the border, did not complete the process of setting the boundaries between Syria and Lebanon prior to the end of the French colonial administration in 1946. 

Border disputes arose which resulted in the creation of a Lebanese-Syrian Border Demarcation Commission, which acted in 1964 to establish an international frontier between Lebanon and Syria and which placed the Shebaa Farms District within Lebanese national territory.[9]  However, the results of the commission were never recorded and the older maps showing the farms district as being in Syria continued to be used.  Prior to the 1967 Six Day War, Syria militarily established itself in the District so that by the time of the Six Day War in June of 1967, Syria was in de facto control of the Farms District. 

[10]

At the close of the 1967 War, the Golan Heights were occupied by Israel and included in that occupation was the Shebaa Farm District.  Resolution of the state of war which exists between Syria and Israel has always been predicated upon United Nations Resolution 242.[11]  That resolution calls for an Israeli withdrawal “from territories occupied in the recent conflict”.  Syria has always interpreted the resolution to mean an Israeli withdrawal from all lands that Syria occupied or controlled on June 4, 1967.  The Israelis have interpreted the resolution to require the parties to establish the international boundary between the two countries looking at such matters as the 1949 Armistice line, as well as Paulet-Newcombe which established the international frontier by the former colonial powers of France and Great Britain.[12]  Israel has claimed that as the successor to Palestine, it should have the benefit of the colonially established international frontier line.

What is clear from the history of the border disputes, which will be a material component of any peace agreement achieved between Syria and Israel, is that a resolution of the Shebaa Farms dispute can and will prejudice the outcome of the Syrian-Israeli negotiation with regard to boundaries and riparian rights to Lake Tiberias and the Upper Jordan River system.  These issues are critical to the water security interests for Israel and critical to Syria regaining all of its occupied territory from Israel.

Should the Farms District be turned over to Lebanon by the Israelis, this would be a settlement that goes behind the boundaries established in 1967 and recognized in 1974 at the conclusion of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  This would seriously muddle the negotiations between Israel and Syria as their negotiation is premised upon implementation of UNRES 242.  By that resolution, the Shebaa District should be returned to Syrian sovereignty.  To do otherwise would be to set a precedent of recognizing borders other than the June 4, 1967 lines prior to the resolution of larger issues that are before the Israeli and Syrian negotiators.

Furthermore, an Israeli turnover of the Farms District to the UNIFIL which continues to operate in Lebanon under a mandate extension that runs until July 28, 2005[13], would be tantamount to a de facto admission that the Shebaa Farm District is Lebanese sovereign territory governed by UNRES 425 rather than Resolution 242.  This would have the same effect of creating a precedent for setting international boundaries in a manner which may prove needlessly prejudicial to the Syrian position vis a vis the Israelis,  further complicating those rather difficult prospective negotiations. 

NALA Recommendation

Therefore, NALA proposes the passage of a new UN Resolution which addresses the Shebaa Farms District and establishes an independent UN Force to occupy and administer the district until the Syrian-Israeli peace talks have been conducted and completed.  At that time, the Lebanese-Syrian Border Commission may take action to resolve the border dispute and failing that the matter may be decided by an international tribunal. 

However the temporary solution of establishing a UN force in the Farms District in lieu of the existing Israeli Army presence, will remove the rationale used by Hezbollah with regard to the necessity to remain under arms as a necessary means of armed resistance against Israel. 

2.  The Armed Palestinian Presence

Second, Hezbollah claims as a rationale to remained armed the fact that there is an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon.  Armed Palestinians are a relic of the war years in Lebanon.  Palestinian refugee camps were first established in Lebanon under UNRES 302 which created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). This Agency is charged with administering the refugee camps established as a consequence of the 1948 Arab – Israeli War.

Following the Six-Day War of 1967, Palestinian guerillas took on an aggressive stance toward the countries hosting Palestinian refugees. In Jordan, the effort to create a Palestinian State within Jordan failed when on “Black September” of 1970, King Hussein crushed the PLO and forced them out of Jordan.  Earlier, in November of 1969, following a series of clashes between Palestinian fighters and the Lebanese Army a crisis was created when the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rachid Karami resigned over the Army’s actions taken against the Palestinians.  The crisis was resolved with the Cairo Accord by which the Palestinians were guaranteed the right to maintain an armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese territory as well as other social and economic rights.  It was under this regional accord that Palestinian arms were first sanctioned in Lebanon.

            In May of 1973, there was an escalation of tensions caused by arrests of elements of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DLFP), which caused the retaliatory kidnapping of two soldiers of the Lebanese Army and this led to the Army’s surrounding the refugee camps and laying siege to them.  The PLO responded by shelling Beirut Airport and a national emergency ensued.

            The crisis was resolved on May 17, 1973 with what came to be known as the Melkart Protocol to the Cairo Agreement.  By the terms of this protocol, the PLO was obligated to respect the “independence, stability and sovereignty” of Lebanon and in exchange the PLO was given virtual autonomy, including the right to maintain its own militia forces inside of Lebanon.  This was the principal instrument that facilitated the creation of a virtual Palestinian state within the Lebanese state and precipitated the Lebanon war as the PLO commenced to flagrantly violate the “protocol” as soon as it was signed.[14]

            In 1982 the Israeli Army defeated the PLO in Lebanon and in 1987, the Lebanese government formally abrogated the Cairo Accords.[15]  There is no basis in law or by color of law by which Palestinian refugees may maintain an armed presence on Lebanese soil. 

NALA Recommendation

Since these camps are still administered under the 1949 United Nations Resolution, NALA recommends that under the terms of UNRES 302, that the Palestinian refugees surrender their arms and as long as they remain as guests in Lebanon they comply with Lebanese law with regard to the right to bear arms and that they submit to Lebanese authority in all matters over which the Lebanese government may exercise its authority over any part of sovereign Lebanese territory.  UNRES 1559 in its first provision calls for the extension of Lebanese authority over all Lebanese territory which includes the refugee camps, and the third operative provisions requires the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. This would include armed Palestinian irregulars present on Lebanese soil.

B.  Hezbollah’s Domestic Social Programs

            Hezbollah’s focus on social services began in a coordinated fashion with the establishment of Jihad al Binna in 1988 in response to an explosion that partially demolished buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs.  Hezbollah essentially fills a void in public services that the Lebanese government has not filled or never filled.  Recently Hezbollah has established two agricultural centers in the Western Bekaa district to assist the farming population there.[16]  This is in addition to health care, clothing, housing and education programs run by Hezbollah.  Some of these programs are run in conjunction with the Lebanese government, some outside of programs funded by the Lebanese government.

            It is reported that since the death of PLO leader Yasser Arafat on November 10, 2004, Hezbollah has received an additional $22 million dollars from Iranian intelligence to support Palestinian terrorist groups.  Iran also funnels money to Hezbollah through supposed private charities.   Mohammad Raad, leader of Hezbollah’s Parliamentary bloc in Lebanon readily admits that the group receives funding from Iran, but maintains that these funds are only for health care, education and support of war widows according to a December 20, 2004 Washington Post article by Scott Wilson. [17]

            This aspect of Hezbollah’s support within Lebanon has not been seriously addressed, much less challenged by the Lebanese government.  During its last fact finding mission to Lebanon in May 2005, officers of NALA met with Shiite activists from South Lebanon interested in challenging the political grip by which Amal and Hezbollah hold the south.  It was reported to NALA that there are two elements by which this power base is sustained in south Lebanon.

            First, the 2000 election law by which the recent elections were held artificially magnifies the support of Hezbollah in the south beyond its actual support among the people.  Reportedly, only 35% of the Lebanese residents of the south support Amal and/or Hezbollah, but due to the manner of the districting mandated by the 2000 Electoral law, written by Syrian authorities, Hezbollah is able to claim a monopoly on Parliamentary representation from the south.  In 2005, 10 seats were won outright, with another 4 won by Hezbollah allies.

            Second, Hezbollah holds the allegiance of the people because of the social services rendered.  The activist with which NALA met wishes to initiate a program of providing competitive services in the south through Non-Governmental Organization’s (NGO) which will administer funds derived from western sources to compete with those services subsidized by Iran through the instrumentality of Hezbollah.  Once the Lebanese government has instituted reform measures so as to curb or eliminate the institutionalized corruption introduced by Syria to the Lebanese ministries, aid packages directed to the Lebanese government could be used to fund a more active public or social sector in the Lebanese budget.

NALA Recommendations

            NALA therefore recommends that the independent group of Shiite activists be given an audience within the United States Administration and be heard.  We recommend that the condition in the south is yet another reason to encourage the newly elected Parliament to reform its electoral law, which will govern the next Parliamentary elections, so that the law will allow for a more representative parliament to be elected.  Under the current law, 65% of the people of the south are represented by Deputies who reflect the will of only 35% of the population and the benefactor is Hezbollah.  The electoral playing field needs to be brought into balance.

            Second, NALA recommends funding of the independent NGO’s which will operate in the south, the Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut providing social services and assistance to the constituency which is now exclusively being served by Hezbollah.  By encouraging the implementation of reforms of the Lebanese government, the US should, upon Lebanon enacting such reforms, include as a condition to any international economic assistance package in which the US may participate, with the EU or other contributor groups, a provision that these social programs shall be a required appropriation and use for the funds. 

Summary and Conclusion

            With the objective of ending the regional threat posed by the “A-Team” of international terrorism in a peaceful manner, the United States should pursue policies which will encourage the transition of Hezbollah from an armed resistance movement to a domestic political party operating within the Lebanese system.  Hezbollah grew in size, strength and dimension in Syrian occupied Lebanon far beyond its actual strength.  Now that the occupation has come to an end, there is much that the international community can do to better insure that this peaceful transition takes place.

            Regarding the armed nature of Hezbollah, in order to address the resistance rationale, NALA recommends the removal of the Israeli presence from the Shebaa Farms District as a necessary precondition to the entry of Hezbollah into negotiations with the Lebanese government for the surrender, turn over, or incorporation of its arms into the Lebanese Armed Forces where those arms will come under the command and control of the civilian political authorities of the duly elected Lebanese government.  Since the removal of Israeli forces from the Shebaa Farms District cannot take place prior to a resolution of the Israeli-Syrian negotiating track, NALA recommends passage of a new UN Resolution to serve as a bridging mechanism to a point in time, after Syria and Israel have resolved their border disputes, when Syria and Lebanon can resolve the issue of the Shebaa Farms.

            In order to address the defensive rationale for the armed nature of Hezbollah, NALA calls for the full implementation of UNRES 1559 and its provisions requiring the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, including that of the Palestinian refugee camps, and the disarming of all non-Lebanese militia on Lebanese soil, which includes armed Palestinians.

            Regarding the civilian or social services basis of Hezbollah, NALA recommends that the Lebanese government be given positive incentives to pass a new Electoral Law to govern future parliamentary elections by which the people can be more fully represented, not only in areas where Hezbollah has won seats in the recently concluded elections, but throughout all of Lebanon.  NALA further recommends that a reform package for the entire Lebanese government receive positive incentives from the international community so as to accelerate the facilitation of funding for social service programs through the Lebanese government to the constituency currently being serviced by Iranian funds through the auspices of Hezbollah Party workers.

            This is a dual approach intended to bring under government auspices those services, whether in terms of military defense or providing a social safety net to the people, those activities which are properly to be performed only under the sovereign authority of the state.  The people of Lebanon will be served and the true intentions of Hezbollah can then be known.